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THE NEW DISCRIMINATION LAW: PRICE WATERHOUSE IS
DEAD, WHITHER McDONNELL DOUGLAS?
Michael J. Zimmer*
I met a traveller from an antique land
Who said: Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert. Near them, on the sand
Half sunk, a shatter'd visage lies, whose frown
And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamp'd on these lifeless things,
The hand that mock'd them and the heart that fed;
And on the pedestal these words appear:
"My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!"
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare,
The lone and level sands stretch far away.
-P.B. Shelley, Ozymandias of Egypt'
The process dictated by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 [in § 703(m)] is
more useful than the analysis required by McDonnell Douglas.
-Liu v. Amway Corp.
2
Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. I need to specially recognize Margaret Moses and Charlie
Sullivan for both pushing me forward on this elusive trip I have undertaken. Charlie provided the apt quote
from Shelley. I also want to thank Ken Adams, David "Jake" Barnes, Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bill Corbett, Tristin
Green, Ann McGinley, Marc Poirier, Joe Slater, and Rebecca Hanner White for their insightful comments on
various drafts. Finally, my research assistant, Dana Stumberger, Seton Hall Law School Class of 2005,
provided significant help; she never complained when we seemed to be starting over. They all contributed
greatly to this Article, though all mistakes are solely my responsibility.
1 Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias of Egypt, in THE GOLDEN TREASURY OF THE BEST SONGS AND
LYRICAL POEMS IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 247 (Francis T. Palgrave ed., 1875).
2 347 F.3d 1125, 1141 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Perhaps the most surprising decision of a rather surprising Supreme Court's
2002 Term3 was Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.4 While it was not unexpected
that the Court might grant certiorari on an en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit
favoring the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case, 5 it was startling
that the Court was unanimous in affirming a proplaintiff outcome. Equally
unexpected was the potential breadth of Justice Thomas's opinion for the
Court.6  While limiting the decision to a simple question of statutory
interpretation-is "direct" evidence of discrimination required under § 703(m)
of Title VII?-the logic of the Court's opinion will have a profound effect on
individual disparate treatment cases. Section 703(m), which was added to Title
VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 7 provides: "Except as otherwise provided
in this [title], an unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice. ' 8  Construing this provision for the first
3 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275-76 (2003) (striking down a voluntary affirmative
action plan); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
1039 (1986)); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003) (rejecting a state sovereign
immunity claim).
4 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
5 Two notes describing the Ninth Circuit en banc decision, perhaps anticipating a reversal by the
Supreme Court, both criticize it as inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. See Brian W. McKay,
Comment, Mixed Motives Mix-Up: The Ninth Circuit Evades the Direct Evidence Requirement in Disparate
Treatment Cases, 38 TULSA L. REV. 503 (2003); Note, Employment Law Discrimination-Ninth Circuit
Finds for Employee in a Mixed-Motive Case Without "Direct Evidence" of Discrimination-Costa v. Desert
Palace, Inc., 116 HARv. L. REV. 1897 (2003). But see Kelly Pierce, Comment, A Fire Without Smoke: The
Elimination of the Direct Evidence Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Cases in Costa
v. Desert Palace, Inc., 87 MINN. L. REV. 2173, 2212 (2003) ("Costa reached the correct conclusion.").
6 Early attempts to answer some of the questions about the potential breadth of the decision can be
found in several authorities. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1972-2003: May You Rest in
Peace?, 6 U. PA. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 219 (2003); Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price
Waterhouse Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. L. REV. 859, 861 (2004); Jeffrey
A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!": An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the
Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 71, 76 (2003).
7 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) (emphasis added). Proving race or gender was a motivating factor
guarantees plaintiff some relief but not necessarily full remedies. A companion provision, § 706(g)(2)(B),
provides a "same decision" affirmative defense to full remedies in a § 703(m) case:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section [703(m)] and a respondent
demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor, the court-
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and
attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a
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time, the Court applied a plain meaning approach, deciding that: "In order to
obtain an instruction under [§ 703(m)], a plaintiff need only present sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of evidence,
that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for
any employment practice."' 9 Rejecting literally hundreds of lower court
decisions, the Court concluded that "direct evidence of discrimination is not
required in mixed-motive cases."'
'0
This straightforward application of a statutory provision-not reading a
"direct" evidence threshold into a statute when Congress did not put one
there-may not seem momentous. However, the decision is the latest in a
series of employment discrimination cases by the Court, beginning in 1996
with O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., that take a sharply
different tack from the cases that came immediately before. After a
proplaintiff period in the early days of Title VII, the Court, between 1981 and
1993, appeared to implement antidiscrimination law by generating legal
rules-i.e., rules that operated to keep plaintiffs from getting to trial or to
sustain their verdicts in post-trial review. After 1996, however, the Court
seems to have refocused individual discrimination cases away from the rules
that keep plaintiffs from the jury and instead has focused on the evidence in the
record and the inferences that can be drawn based on that evidence. By
rejecting the pretext-plus rule and by carefully reviewing all of the plaintiffs
evidence in the full record, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,2 took a
step in that direction. Desert Palace surely continues that evolution. Even
more significantly, Desert Palace may revolutionize individual disparate
treatment discrimination law.
This Article begins by briefly tracing the evolution of individual disparate
treatment discrimination law. Part I develops the first approach adopted by the
Supreme Court. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,13 the Supreme Court
claim under section [703(m)]; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring,
promotion, or payment, described in [subsection] (A).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Section 701(m) was also added which defines the term
"demonstrates" which is used in both § 703(m) and § 706(g)(2)(B): "The term 'demonstrates' means meets the
burdens of production and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 1.
9 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101.
1o Id.
" 517 U.S. 308 (1996); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
12 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
3 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 53 Emory L.J. 1889 2004
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
interpreted Title VII broadly, giving plaintiffs latitude to prove discrimination
even in the absence of an employer's admission of discrimination and in the
absence of substantial evidence of discrimination of any kind. 14  Almost
immediately thereafter, however, the Court began to retreat from McDonnell
Douglas. This second stage started with Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine15 and culminated in the extremely rule-oriented approaches
in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins16 and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.
17
These rules, and their progeny generated by the lower courts, made it
increasingly difficult for plaintiffs, even those with compelling cases, to have
their cases decided at trial.
Beginning in 1996, and before Desert Palace, the Court decided three
cases, each reacting against rules created by the lower courts that operated to
short-circuit plaintiffs' individual discrimination cases. However, these cases
elaborated on the McDonnell Douglas mode of analysis. By the time Desert
Palace was decided, the now heavily glossed McDonnell Douglas analysis
offered a substantially more plaintiff-friendly law than that which had
predominated previously. Part II develops the second approach of proof for
individual disparate treatment created in the Supreme Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 18
Ironically, Desert Palace effectively expanded the reach of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, one of the few post-McDonnell Douglas cases viewed
as plaintiff-friendly. Price Waterhouse, contrary to the prodefendant thrust of
Hazen Paper and Hicks, favored plaintiffs by creating an alternative and more
favorable method of analyzing disparate treatment cases. 19 But the benefits of
14 McDonnell Douglas can be seen as a "transformative" legal rule, i.e., a rule that operates to counter the
application of typical approaches that, if applied, would undermine the purpose of antidiscrimination law. See
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Burdens of Equality: Burdens of Proof and Presumptions in Indian and
American Civil Rights Law, 47 AM. J. CoMP. L. 89, 89-93 (1999).
"5 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (establishing a three-step litigation structure for McDonnell Douglas
cases).
16 507 U.S. 604, 611-12 (1993) (evidence of pension discrimination is not probative of age
discrimination even though age is correlated with pension status).
17 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (plaintiff must convince factfinder that she was the victim of defendant's
intentional discrimination even if plaintiff proves a prima facie case and defendant's asserted reason is not
worthy of credence).
" 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
19 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. When the plaintiff could point to "direct" evidence of
discrimination, the case would be analyzed pursuant to Price Waterhouse, whereby a prima facie case of
discrimination could be established by showing that discrimination was a "substantial factor" in the
employer's adverse action against the plaintiff. Id. at 240-42. The defendant, however, could escape liability
by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it would not have discriminated. Id. at 242. If
[Vol. 53
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Price Waterhouse were narrowly confined to a small subset of cases because
of the boundary drawn between the two methods of proof-the presence or
absence of "direct" evidence of the employer's intent to discriminate.
Congress liberalized Price Waterhouse with amendments to Title VII in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 20 but the extent of that liberalization was contested.
The first two Parts set the stage for understanding Desert Palace and its
ramifications.
Part III discusses the Desert Palace decision and the effect it had on cases
brought pursuant to § 703(m). Part IV then shows that the Price Waterhouse
method of proof has lost any independent significance apart from § 703(m).
Part V analyzes the potential impact that Desert Palace may have on the
McDonnell Douglas method of proving individual disparate treatment.
Important for its core holding, Desert Palace may go well beyond its
immediate predecessors in the McDonnell Douglas line of cases by creating
the basis for a uniform method of proof for individual discrimination cases that
focuses on the evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from that
evidence, all without regard to differentiated rules regarding proof structures.
In other words, without giving up the surviving advantages to plaintiffs created
in the first round of interpretation of Title VII, discrimination litigation may
increasingly resemble general civil litigation. Part VI discusses the
implications for the litigation of individual disparate treatment cases under this
more uniform structure of proof. It is the thesis of this Article that a new,
uniform proof structure will evolve from Desert Palace and that the approach
established in § 703(m) will apply to almost all individual discrimination
cases.
the plaintiff failed to point to "direct" evidence of discrimination, then as the default approach, McDonnell
Douglas would apply. Using that approach, the plaintiff needed to prove that discrimination was the
determinative influence in the employer's action she was challenging. She did this by proving that the most
common legitimate reasons for the employer's decision did not apply to her and that the nondiscriminatory
reason asserted by the defendant was not true. Such a showing would typically allow, but not require, the
factfinder to draw the inference of discrimination because the reason advanced by the employer was pretext for
discrimination.
20 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991).
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 53 Emory L.J. 1891 2004
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
I. THE EVOLUTION OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AND THE PRETEXT METHOD OF
ANALYSIS
The story starts with the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.21 While making it unlawful for an employer to discriminate "because
of" an "individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," Congress did
not define "discriminate" or "because of.'22  That left it to the courts to
develop the core prohibitions of Title VII and how they were to be applied.
Two different definitions soon emerged. The first was "disparate impact"
discrimination. 23 Intent to discriminate is not an element of a disparate impact
case; instead, liability attaches if an employment practice of an employer has a
disproportionate impact on a group protected by Title VII and if the practice is
not justified by business necessity.24  Subsequently, the Court developed the
concept of disparate treatment discrimination, which has as its core the
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
22 The basic substantive provision of Title VII is § 703(a), which provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a). The terms "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" were also undefined. Subsequently,
"religion" was defined to require employers to reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs and practices of
their employees, id. § 2000e(j), and "sex" was defined to include pregnancy, id. § 2000e(k).
23 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Disparate impact is consistent with § 703(a)(2),
which makes it unlawful for an employer to "limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)
(emphasis added). The absence of an intent to discriminate element is also consistent with dictionary
definitions of "discriminate." See, e.g., THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 488 (2001) (defining
"discriminate" as "make an unjust or prejudicial distinction in the treatment of different categories of people or
things, esp. on the grounds of race, sex, or age"); WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 564 (1996) (defining "discriminate" as "to make a distinction in favor of or against a
person... on the basis of the group, class, or category to which the person ... belongs rather than according to
actual merit .... ); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 648 (1981) (defining "discriminate"
as "to make a difference in treatment or favor on a class or categorical basis in disregard of individual merit").
24 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.01 (3d ed. 2002); see also Michael J. Zimmer, Individual Disparate
Impact Law: On the Plain Meaning of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 30 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 473 (1999) (developing
disparate impact theory to protect individuals from unintentional discrimination).
[Vol. 53
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employer's intent to discriminate.z5 In distinguishing the two concepts, the
Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States noted that
the disparate treatment notion was more intuitive:
"Disparate treatment" . .. is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it
can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences
in treatment ....26
Describing disparate treatment as "the most easily understood type of
discrimination" is, however, belied by the Court's next two sentences. The
first one posits an unequal treatment concept of discrimination without an
intent to discriminate element-"The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others"-while the next posits a state of mind notion-"Proof
of discriminatory motive is critical." Presumably the synthesis of the two
comes in the final clause of the second sentence providing that discriminatory
motive is the key element but that it "can in some situations be inferred from
the mere fact of differences of treatment."
27
Within the category of individual disparate treatment (or intentional)
discrimination cases, two separate methods of analyzing individual
discrimination cases thereafter emerged: 28 the so-called McDonnell Douglas
and Price Waterhouse approaches. The first method was articulated in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green29 where, without defining the terms
"discriminate" or "because of," the Court established a process and method of
25 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (individual disparate treatment
discrimination),
26 431 U.S. 324,335 n.15 (1977). The Court distinguished disparate impact as follows:
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress "disparate impact."
The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different
groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a
disparate-impact theory.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
27 Even if not unequal, some treatment of an employee can be disparate treatment if that treatment was
motivated by discriminatory intent when it would not be discriminatory in absence of that intent.
28 Another concept of what constitutes discrimination-systemic disparate treatment discrimination-
which is intentional discrimination shown by employer policies or practices that discriminate, was also
developed during this period. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360.
29 411 U.S. 792; see also Van Detta, supra note 6, at 80 (arguing that McDonnell Douglas was wrongly
decided in the first instance).
2004]
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proof for individual intentional discrimination cases. The process was one of
elimination 30  by which plaintiff could prove discrimination using
circumstantial evidence without having to show that the employer had
admitted that it was discriminating. 31  Plaintiff had to prove that the most
32
common legitimate reasons an employer might have for not rehiring the
plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas-either that he did not meet the minimal
qualifications or that no job was open--did not apply.33 By doing so, plaintiff
established a prima facie case. Eliminating these legitimate reasons for not
rehiring plaintiff allowed the factfinder, without more, to draw an inference
that an impermissible reason, here race discrimination, had motivated the
employer. 34 Indeed, the prima facie showing required the inference unless the
defendant responded by challenging the employee's proof or by providing
another explanation. In short, the employer was required to respond. "The
30 See John Valery White, Vindicating Rights in a Federal System: Rediscovering 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)'s
Equality Right, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 145, 204 (1996) (describing McDonnell Douglas as involving a process of
elimination).
31 An admission against interest, such as a statement by the employer that "I didn't promote you because
you are a women," would be significant evidence of discrimination. But, if Title VII was limited to such
cases, the scope of application would be quite limited since employers have many interests in not making such
admissions, especially if true. See Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate
Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107, 1162-63 (1991).
32 Eliminating the most common nondiscriminatory reasons still left open the possibility that some other
nondiscriminatory reason or reasons may have motivated the employer.
33 The Court elaborated the prima facie case requirements as follows:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing
a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a
racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons
of complainant's qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The significance and scope of this rule-like statement has always been
in doubt. While it clearly applied to the plaintiff in the case, it was not clear if it was case specific or if it set
forth a more general rule. An accompanying footnote may be read as limiting the precise application of the
rule to cases with similar fact patterns: "The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the
specifications above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every
respect to differing factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13.
34 In Furnco Construction v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978), the Court described why this process of
elimination set up in McDonnell Douglas supported drawing an inference of discrimination.
[W]e know from our experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary
manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all
legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the
employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, whom we assume generally acts only
with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race.
Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 53
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burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 35  In McDonnell
Douglas, the defendant carried that burden by showing that Green, the
plaintiff, had participated in illegal protest activities aimed at it and by
claiming that it decided not to rehire Green because of that reason. With that
rebuttal, the record included an alternative explanation that vied with plaintiff s
claim of discrimination. Thus, the process of elimination was not satisfied.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff had one more chance to win: He could prove "that
petitioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection was in fact pretext.,
36
Presumably, the plaintiff, by discrediting the defendant's supposedly legitimate
reason, would re-establish the finding of discrimination supported by the prima
facie case.37 As we will see, however, things were not to be so simple.
A. The Period of Rule Generation Favoring Employers
By 1981, the Court began to change course by adopting rules for individual
disparate treatment cases that favored employers.38  In Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine,39 the Supreme Court rejected a lower court
interpretation of McDonnell Douglas that shifted the burden of persuasion to
the defendant to prove that the nondiscriminatory reason it asserted was in fact
the actual reason for its conduct. Having decided that the plaintiff bore the
burden of persuasion throughout, the Court then developed McDonnell
Douglas into a three-step set of rules for litigating individual discrimination
cases. First, if the factfinder believes the plaintiffs prima facie showing that
the most common nondiscriminatory reasons do not apply and if defendant
35 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
36 Id. at 804.
37 The process of elimination involves a kind of Bayesian analysis. In the abstract, there are an almost
infinite number of reasons that might motivate any given decision, but there are relatively few that are likely to
be the actual reason. The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas eliminated the most likely reasons to establish a
prima facie case. While only a small subset of all the possible reasons, this showing is a larger subset of the
likely reasons. That justifies requiring the employer to introduce evidence of other reasons. If, in turn, the
defendant's reasons are held not to explain the action, it is fair to permit the factfinder to conclude that
probability favors discrimination as the reason. See generally D. Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L. Loop, Three
Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and "Offender Profiling": Some Lessons of Modern Cognitive
Science for the Law of Evidence, 24 CARDozo L. REv. 193, 200 n.15 (2002) ("Bayes' Theorem deals with
sequential revision of probabilities from a starting point (the initial or prior probability) through the integration
of new probability-affecting information."). My thanks to my colleagues: To Charlie Sullivan who pointed
this out and to Mike Risinger who developed this theory as applied to evidence.
38 While McDonnell Douglas involved the creation of a rule favorable to plaintiffs, the cases described in
this section are defendant-friendly.
39 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Because of its emphasis on rules, Burdine can be seen as foreshadowing the
period that was to come.
2004]
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offers no alternative explanation, a presumption of discrimination is
established. The plaintiff wins because it is reasonable to assume the employer
40did not act randomly, but with purpose. Putting this another way, with no
rebuttal reason from the employer, the only reason in the record is the
plaintiffs claim that the employer discriminated.4' Second, if the defendant
does introduce evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the
presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie case is rebutted. Since
there is then evidence of two possible reasons explaining the employer's
action 42---either the reason the employer asserts or discrimination-there is no
basis for drawing the inference of discrimination in preference to the
employer's nondiscriminatory explanation. If the case goes no further,
plaintiff loses for failing to carry her burden of persuasion that the adverse
action taken against her by the employer was discriminatory.43 The third and
final step, however, gives plaintiff a last chance to win: The plaintiff retains
the burden of persuasion. She now must have the opportunity to demonstrate
that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that
she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may proceed in this
either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proferred
explanation is unworthy of credence.
44
40 The Court has indicated that it is to be assumed that employers make employment decisions for a
reason. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
41 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 ("If the trier of fact believes the plaintiffs evidence, and if the employer is
silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment because no issue of fact remains in the
case.").
42 There continues to be the possibility that other reasons, not in the record, actually motivated the
employer. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 (1993) (rejecting plaintiff's claim of
discrimination and the nondiscriminatory reasons asserted by the defendant, the trial court nevertheless found
that plaintiff failed to carry his burden of persuasion because the judge thought that the actual motivation for
the employer's adverse decision was the personal animosity between plaintiff and his new supervisor, even
though there was no evidence of that animosity in the record evidence).
43 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presumption of discrimination by
producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually
motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff .... If the defendant carries this
burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted ....
Id.
44 Id. at 256. McDonnell Douglas involves a change from the standard approach in civil litigation for the
surrebuttal of defendant's rebuttal. Generally, only evidence contradicting the defendant's factual assertion is
1896 (Vol. 53
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After all this, if there is evidence in the record sufficient to raise a question
of fact on the ultimate question of whether the defendant's reason is pretext
and, therefore, with other evidence supports drawing the inference that the
plaintiff was the victim of discrimination, then the case goes to the factfinder,
with the factfinder deciding whether to draw that inference. Thus, as of 1981,
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine formed the basic structure of individual
disparate treatment law.
Over time, the McDonnell Douglas method came to be identified by
different nomenclature. One description labels it the "circumstantial evidence"
test because it does not require evidence that amounts to an admission by the
defendant.45 Because this process eliminates reasons other than discrimination,
McDonnell Douglas has also been called an "indirect" method of proof.
Stripping away the reasons other than discrimination, which leaves
discrimination as the likely explanation, is an "indirect" method of deciding
46
whether the employer discriminated. McDonnell Douglas also came to be
identified as the "pretext" method because every case ultimately focuses on the
third step set forth in Burdine. That step generally involves the plaintiff trying
to prove that the nondiscriminatory reason the employer asserts is "unworthy
of credence"-i.e., the reason asserted by the defendant does not really explain
why the defendant acted as it did. With that proof, the factfinder can infer that
admitted in surrebuttal. See 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 6164 (2d ed. 1990). But, McDonnell Douglas allows a much broader range of evidence at the
pretext stage:
[Elvidence that may be relevant to any showing of pretext includes facts as to the petitioner's
treatment of respondent during his prior term of employment; petitioner's reaction, if any, to
respondent's legitimate civil rights activities; and petitioner's general policy and practice with
respect to minority employment. On the latter point, statistics as to petitioner's employment
policy and practice may be helpful to a determination of whether petitioner's refusal to rehire
respondent in this case conformed to a general pattern of discrimination against blacks.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973). Further and "[e]specially relevant to such
a showing [of pretext] would be evidence that white employees involved in acts against petitioner of
comparable seriousness to the 'stall-in' were nevertheless retained or rehired." Id. at 804. This is less radical
than it might seem, given that a Title VH trial follows the normal, two-step procedure of civil litigation. Thus,
plaintiff puts in her case in chief, including all her evidence supporting a finding of pretext, followed by the
defendant that puts in all its evidence in rebuttal.
45 This also distinguishes McDonnell Douglas cases from Price Waterhouse cases that require "direct"
evidence.
46 "Indirect" is in contrast with a more "direct" way of deciding that discrimination was the motivating
reason for the employer's decision. "Direct" could mean an admission against interest. But it might have a
different meaning such as a violation of equal treatment: Despite being similarly situated but for their gender,
the employer treated two employees differently. A violation of equal treatment seems at least more direct than
the indirect process of elimination set up in McDonnell Douglas.
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the employer's assertion was a pretext in the sense of covering up or hiding the
real reason, which was discrimination.47 Finally, the McDonnell Douglas
approach has also been called the "single motive" method of proving
discrimination because the question the factfinder is asked to decide can be
articulated basically as an either/or proposition: Was the reason for the
challenged action the reason asserted by the employer or was the reason
discrimination as claimed by the plaintiff? 8
In 1989, the Supreme Court rendered a series of decisions that involved a
cutback in the scope of civil rights protections in a variety of areas. 49 Among
them was Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,50 where the Court discussed the
scope of evidence that plaintiff could use to show pretext in a McDonnell
Douglas case. On one hand, the Court reversed a lower court ruling that
narrowed plaintiffs' range of possibly relevant evidence in the final, pretext
stage to evidence specifically rebutting the nondiscriminatory reason asserted
by the employer.5' On the other hand, the range of evidence available to the
plaintiff at the pretext stage was not described as broadly as that allowed in
McDonnell Douglas.52 Thus, the Court appeared to alter one of the distinctive
47 As the Court in Burdine recognized, this final step merges the issue of pretext with the ultimate issue
of the defendant's motivation. That ultimate issue can be decided based on a direct, an indirect, or a
combination of direct and indirect approaches.
48 This "single motive" description does not, however, require plaintiff to prove that discrimination was
the sole cause of the employer's action. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989), the
Court noted that Congress did not intend the words "because of' in § 703(a)(1) and (2) to mean "solely
because of." Further, Congress rejected an amendment to Title VII that would have established a sole cause
standard. See id. at 241 n.7 (citing 110 CONG. REc. 13837 (1964)).
49 See Michael A. Zubrensky, Note, Despite the Smoke, There Is No Gun: Direct Evidence Requirements
In Mixed-Motives Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 STAN. L. REV. 959, 983 n.196
(1994) (discussing the 1989 decisions of the Supreme Court that caused the 1991 Civil Rights Act to be
enacted); see also 137 CONG. REc. S15,483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
'0 491 U.S. 164 (1989). The decision is notorious for its strained interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
wherein only contract formation was protected against race discrimination. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 122-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to overturn this aspect of
Patterson by adding new subsection (b) which states "for the purposes of this section, the term 'make and
enforce contracts' includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship").
51 "The District Court erred, however, in instructing the jury that in order to succeed petitioner was
required to make [a] showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position."
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 188. Had the lower court decision, which applied the rule for scope of surrebuttal
evidence generally applicable in civil litigation, been upheld, that would have eliminated one of the
distinguishing features of the McDonnell Douglas method: allowing plaintiff to introduce a broad range of
evidence at the pretext step of an individual disparate treatment case.
52 The Court described the range of pretext evidence that plaintiff might adduce:
[P]etitioner could seek to persuade the jury that respondent had not offered the true reason for its
promotion decision by presenting evidence of respondent's past treatment of petitioner, including
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features of McDonnell Douglas by narrowing the evidentiary opportunities of
plaintiffs.53
Much more significant cases generating prodefendant. rules were the
Supreme Court's two 1993 decisions interpreting McDonnell Douglas. The
most notorious54 decision was St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,5 5 which made
the instances of the racial harassment which she alleges and respondent's failure to train her for
an accounting position.
Id. The opinion for the Court did not mention evidence of the general policy and practice of the employer
concerning the employment of African Americans, especially statistical evidence. All of this was allowed as
potentially relevant and probative evidence in McDonnell Douglas. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 217 (Brennan,
J., dissenting in part) (citing to the breadth of evidence that is potentially relevant and probative of pretext);
supra note 29. -
53 Given that a trial of a Title VII case follows the normal civil trial practice of having the plaintiff first
put in her entire case, including evidence of pretext, which is subject to defendant's cross examination, and
then having defendant put on its entire case, also subject to plaintiffs cross, the breadth of the evidence
admissible to prove "pretext" is not ultimately different from normal civil trial because the whole trial
typically focuses on the "pretext" stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
54 Hicks has been severely criticized. Mark S. Brodin attacks Hicks for violating "two of the most basic
tenets of American procedure . . . first, that the court is a passive tribunal, not an active player in the
construction of arguments and theories; and second, that cases are to be decided solely on the basis of the
evidence presented, not the conjecture of the factfinder." Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof
in Employment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the "Personality"
Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 209-10 (1997). More broadly, he concludes that Hicks "stands
as a veritable guide for avoiding liability. Title VII should not become the vehicle for legitimating the very
conduct it is directed toward prohibiting." Id. at 239; see also Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies and Ideology: The
Wages of Sin is Now Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 994 (1995) (criticizing Hicks because "Title
VlI's rules must help plaintiffs pierce corporate and governmental veils of secrecy and . . . scrape away
concreted discriminatory sediment"); William R. Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater, and Throwing Out Proof of
Structures: It's Not Time To Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 361, 366-67
(1998); Melissa A. Essary, The Dismantling of McDonnell Douglas v. Green: The High Court Muddies the
Evidentiary Waters in Circumstantial Discrimination Cases, 21 PEPP..L. REV. 385, 385 (1994); Ruth Gana
Okejidiji, Status Rules: Doctrine as Discrimination in a Post-Hicks Environment, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 49,
52-53 (1998); Stephen Plass, Truth: The Lost Virtue in Title VII Litigation, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 599, 629-
32 (1998) (pointing out that, contrary to Justice Scalia's claim that even perjury does not warrant a verdict,
employee lies in litigation are often outcome-determinative, including dismissal of their cases). Professor
Henry Chambers argues:
The Hicks Court also leaves the McDonnell Douglas structure in a somewhat confused state. By
undervaluing the McDonnell Douglas structure and its implcations, the Hicks Court suggests that
courts view evidence of pretext more skeptically than they should. Proving that an employer's
LNRs [legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons] are untrue is not easy. Given that LNRs are
provided by the employer presumably to fit the contours of its case and are vigorously defended by
its counsel, convincing a factfinder that the LNRs are untrue or not credible is difficult and should
be treated as powerful evidence of discrimination when it occurs. A plaintiffs showing of pretext
should always be sufficient to avoid a directed verdict against a plaintiff and should generally yield
a verdict for the plaintiff.
Henry K. Chambers Jr., Discrimination, Plain and Simple, 36 TULSA L.J. 557, 573 (2001).
55 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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it much more difficult for plaintiffs to prove discrimination. The decision
rejected the notion in Burdine that the McDonnell Douglas process operated to
narrow the scope of the inquiry to a question of whether the reason for the
employer's action was discrimination or the reason asserted by the employer,
the "either/or" question. Hicks allows reasons for which there was no evidence
in the record to be relied on by the factfinder to find against the plaintiff.
While there would be no basis in the record to find that personal animosity was
the real reason of the defendant for terminating the plaintiff, the plaintiff
nevertheless lost because he failed to carry his burden of persuasion in proving
the ultimate question, that the reason for the action was the intentional
discrimination of the employer.
56
Hicks dramatically limited the usefulness of the McDonnell Douglas
process of eliminating all nondiscriminatory reasons as a threshold to drawing
an inference of discrimination. Freeing the reasons requirement from any link
to evidence in the record leaves open an almost infinite set of possible
explanations other than discrimination. If the factfinder has a hunch the real
explanation for defendant's action is some reason not even mentioned in the
trial, the plaintiff may lose for failing to prove her case.
57
Though subject to much less criticism than Hicks, Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins,58 written by Justice O'Connor, was arguably just as limiting to the full
implementation of the prohibition against discrimination as was Hicks. Here,
the Court restricted the range of circumstantial evidence from which a
factfinder could draw an inference of discrimination by suggesting that any
particular piece of evidence could be relevant only to one type of
56 The trial court rejected defendant's explanation that plaintiff was fired because of his disciplinary
record but also failed to find discrimination because he thought that plaintiff was fired because of the personal
animosity of his supervisor. The only evidence in the record concerning personal animosity was the denial by
the supervisor that it played any role at all.
57 Further, Justice Scalia's opinion suggested to some that, in the final, pretext stage of a McDonnell
Douglas case, plaintiff could reach the factfinder only if she introduced evidence, in addition to proof, that the
reason defendant asserted for its action was not the real reason. However, the holding of the Court, later
confirmed in Reeves, is that "[t]he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the
prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination." Hicks, at 511. But, Justice Scalia added
language that "(1) the plaintiff must show 'both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real
reason,' and (2) 'it is not enough ... to disbelieve the employer."' Id. at 511 n.4 (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis in original). While Justice Scalia disclaimed that this language was inconsistent with the holding,
id., lower courts relied upon it to require the plaintiff to introduce additional evidence over and above evidence
proving the prima facie case and proving that the defendant's asserted reason did not apply to the plaintiff in
order to get to a jury.
" 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
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discrimination. In Hazen Paper, plaintiff claimed both age discrimination and
discrimination because of his pension status. Justice O'Connor concluded that
relying on pension status is not a proxy for age, even though pension status
does correlate with age.59 While it is true that a decision based on years of
service is not necessarily biased against workers over age forty, 60 Hazen Paper
suggests that the correlation of pension status with the age of workers is not
even circumstantial evidence that a factfinder could consider in drawing the
inference of age discrimination. In Hazen Paper, the plaintiff proved that he
was not discharged for the reason the employer asserted--doing business with
competitors. The court said eliminating that as a nondiscriminatory reason,
however, did not mean that it was reasonable to draw the inference that age
discrimination was the motive for the employer's action. That was because
there was another motive well supported by evidence in the record that
explained the employer's action: the desire of the employer to prevent Biggins'
pension from vesting. Given the ERISA violation for interfering with his
pension, it would be difficult to infer that age discrimination motivated the
employer: "[I]nferring age-motivation from the implausibility of the
employer's explanation [that plaintiff was fired for doing business with
competitors] may be problematic in cases where other unsavory motives, such
as pension interference, were present.
' 6 1
While it is possible that the employer's sole motivation for discharging
Biggins was to prevent his pension from vesting, and so age discrimination
was not at all implicated, it is also possible that his age was a factor in the
decision. For example, the employer might not have discharged Biggins to
prevent his pension from vesting if he had been much younger because receipt
of any pension benefits would have been so much further off.62 Failing to take
'9 Id. at 611.
On average, an older employee has had more years in the work force than a younger employee,
and thus may well have accumulated more years of service with a particular employer. Yet an
employee's age is analytically distinct from his years of service .... Because age and years of
service are analytically distinct, an employer can take account of one while ignoring the other,
and thus it is incorrect to say that a decision based on years of service is necessarily "age-based."
Id.
60 For example, an employee starting service at age eighteen will vest at age twenty-eight in a plan, like
that in Hazen Paper, where pensions vested after ten years of service.
61 ld. at 613.
62 This is a variant on what is called "intersectional" discrimination. Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in THE POLMCS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
193, 200-01 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990), describes intersectional discrimination based on race and
gender:
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account of the possible interaction of age and pension discrimination unduly
narrows discrimination law by restricting the inferences that can be drawn
from circumstantial evidence. 63 This suggests that evidence can be sliced and
diced into separate pieces, with each piece tagged as relevant to only one issue.
After Hazen Paper, some lower courts adopted just such a slice and dice
approach to the evidence in McDonnell Douglas cases.
64
The Court in Hazen Paper also expanded the scope available to employers
for rebuttal, by taking the "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" phrase
originated in McDonnell Douglas and removing any meaning to the term
"legitimate." By accepting an illegal reason-interference with pension
vesting-as a rebuttal to plaintiffs prima facie case, the Court allowed the
defendant to advance any reason other than a reason that could be legally
65
challenged by the plaintiff as a sufficient rebuttal.
Finally, the Court appeared to adopt a high level of proof necessary to
establish liability: "Whatever the employer's decisionmaking process, a
disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected trait
actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the
outcome. '66 This standard seems to be quite similar to a but-for showing; that
is, the plaintiff must show that the defendant would not have made the decision
it did but-for the age, sex, or race of the plaintiff.
I am suggesting that Black women can experience discrimination in ways that are both similar to
and different from those experienced by white women and Black men. Black women sometimes
experience discrimination in ways similar to white women's experiences; sometimes they share
very similar experiences with Black men. Yet often they experience double discrimination-the
combined effects of practices which discriminate on the basis of race, and on the basis of sex. And
sometimes, they experience discrimination as Black women-not the sum of race and sex
discrimination, but as Black women.
63 Based on one sentence in the opinion-"Pension status may be a proxy for age, not in the sense that
the ADEA makes the two factors equivalent, but in the sense that the employer may suppose a correlation
between the two factors and act accordingly," Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 613 (internal citations omitted).
Professor Gary Minda has teased out the possibility that such a showing of discrimination is consistent with
Hazen Paper. See Gary Minda, Opportunistic Downsizing of Aging Workers: The 1990s Version of Age and
Pension Discrimination in Employment, 48 HASTINGS L. 511,537-39 (1997).
64 See discussion of Fifth Circuit's approach in Reeves, infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
65 In Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam), a case dealing with peremptory challenges to
jurors, the prosecutor tried to explain the exclusion of blacks from the jury because of their hair length and
facial hair. Relying on Hazen Paper, the Court held that even nonsensical explanations-"implausible,"
"fantastic," or "superstitious"--satisfied defendant's burden of producing a nondiscriminatory reason. (The
Purkett Court did not cite Hazen Paper-it relied on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).)
66 Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610 (emphasis added).
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In sum, Burdine, Patterson, Hicks, and Hazen Paper all involved the Court
generating rules that made it harder for a plaintiffs individual discrimination
case to proceed to trial or to final judgment. Only three years after Hicks and
Hazen Paper, however, the Court began to shift its focus in individual
discrimination cases.
B. Moving Away from Narrowing Rules
Since Burdine, Hicks, and Hazen Paper, each of which reversed decisions
for plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has decided four individual discrimination
cases, all of which were unanimous victories for plaintiffs. Further, these
decisions moved away from the prior approach of the Court by eschewing
narrowing rules that prevent plaintiff from proving discrimination. Three of
these cases have substantial impact.
67
In O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., the Court
unanimously overturned a rule developed by the Fourth Circuit for age
discrimination cases that had created a "safe harbor" for defendants as long as
the person who replaced the terminated plaintiff was also over forty-years old.
The fact that one person in the protected class [of age 40 or over] has
lost out to another person in the protected class is ... irrelevant, so
long as he has lost out because of his age .... Because the ADEA
prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and not class
membership, the fact that a replacement is substantially younger than
the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination than
is the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the
protected class.69
At the time it was decided, O'Connor was widely seen as the Court's
correction of the Fourth Circuit-which had gone too far in the direction
67 The fourth involves notice pleading of complaints of discrimination. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506 (2002), the Second Circuit had dismissed the plaintiff's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the
complaint did not plead the four factual claims used to establish a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. In a
unanimous decision, the Court, led by Justice Thomas, reversed. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which deals with pleading, establishes a notice pleading rule. The plaintiffs complaint satisfied
that rule's requirement that a complaint must include only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief." Under the Court's view, the four prongs of a McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case do not "apply to the pleading standard that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to survive a motion to
dismiss," id. at 511, because "the prima facie case relates to the employee's burden of presenting evidence that
raises an inference of discrimination." Id. at 510.
" 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
69 ld. at 312-13.
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envisioned by the Court in its 1993 decisions. 70  By providing such a safe
harbor from age discrimination claims involving discharges, the Fourth Circuit
in effect had created a partial judicial nullification of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.71 That was seen as taking the rule approach of Hicks and
Hazen Paper to cut off plaintiffs' cases too far.
The second in time, but the most important, decision in the sequence of
cases before Desert Palace was Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products
72
Here, it became clearer that the Court was changing direction. Justice
O'Connor, again for a unanimous Court, took two important steps away from
the approach she and the Court had taken before 1996. First, the "pretext-plus"
rule that Justice Scalia had suggested in dicta in Hicks,73 which had been taken
up by some of the lower courts including the Fifth Circuit that decided Reeves,
was rejected. The "pretext-plus" rule operated to support summary judgment
or judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff had "only" evidence making
out a prima facie case and evidence disproving defendant's asserted reason.
74
The "plus" rule required more evidence than that to go to trial or to uphold a
verdict if the case had been sent to trial.75 Rejecting that rule, the Court held
that "[a] plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find
that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to
conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. 7 6
The Fifth Circuit's justification for the "pretext-plus" rule was language
from Burdine (later quoted in Hicks) that the presumption of discrimination
70 MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 115-16 (5th
ed. 2000).
71 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
72 530 U.S. 133 (2000). For a fuller treatment of Reeves, see Michael J. Zimmer, Leading by Example:
An Holistic Approach to Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 177, 182-86 (2001)
[hereinafter Zimmer, Leading by Example]; Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing Individual Disparate
Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577, 577, 581-92 (2001) [hereinafter Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing].
73 See supra note 57 for a description of the dicta of Justice Scalia in Hicks relied on by some lower
courts to create the "pretext-plus" rule.
74 Since most all the evidence of why the defendant acted the way it did toward the plaintiff is in the
hands of the defendant, the "pretext-plus" rule substantially undervalues the accomplishment of a plaintiff in
discrediting the defendant's asserted reason for its action.
75 In Burdine, the Court rejected a rle that would give the plaintiffjudgment as a matter of law when she
proved her prima facie case and proved that the defendant's reason was unworthy of credence. The courts that
adopted the "pretext-plus" rule would give the defendant judgment as a matter of law in that situation unless
the plaintiff introduced additional evidence of discrimination. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Secrets and Lies: The
Needfor a Definitive Rule of Law in Pretext Cases, 61 LA. L. REV. 539, 541 (2001); Catherine J. Lanctot, The
Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus " Rule in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 66-67 (1991).
76 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 135.
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created when the plaintiff initially proved the prima facie case "drops out of
the picture" if the defendant introduces evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason
for its action.77 The Fifth Circuit read this language as dropping not only the
presumption but also the probative value of the evidence supporting the prima
facie case. The fact that the plaintiff had eliminated the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employer's decision was no longer
considered when deciding whether to draw the inference of discrimination.
With that evidence excluded from consideration, the process of elimination at
the core of the McDonnell Douglas method meant that, with the only probative
evidence being evidence that the defendant's reason was not credible, there
was not sufficient evidence to allow a jury to draw the inference of
discrimination. It is not surprising, therefore, that the court found that more
evidence was necessary before the plaintiff would be able to prove
discrimination. Hence, the "pretext-plus" rule.
Justice O'Connor rejected this extension of the language of Burdine,
stating, "[A]lthough the presumption of discrimination 'drops out of the
picture' once the defendant meets its burden of production, the trier of fact
may still consider the evidence establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case and
'inferences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of whether the
defendant's explanation is pretextual."' 78  The rule that the evidence
supporting the plaintiff's case must be considered when deciding summary
judgment motions and motions for judgment as a matter of law brings
McDonnell Douglas cases more in line with the approach used in general civil
litigation. And in so doing, the Court seems to be turning away from the
approach of Hicks and Hazen Paper that individual disparate treatment law
should be dominated by legal rules that create obstacles for plaintiffs taking
their cases to trial or in maintaining the fruits of their victories if they did win a
verdict at trial.
In the second step away from the Court's approach in the preceding period
of time, Justice O'Connor called for a more realistic review of the evidence
when courts were deciding motions for summary judgment and for judgment
as a matter of law. While reaffirming the rule that evidence supporting the
plaintiff's case must be reviewed with every inference drawn in favor of the
plaintiff,79 Justice O'Connor found that the Fifth Circuit had misapplied the
77 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
78 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (citations omitted).
79 The Court described the appropriate way to apply Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
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rule in two significant ways. First, "the court disregarded critical evidence
favorable to [Reeves]-namely, the evidence supporting [Reeves's] prima
facie case and undermining [defendant's] nondiscriminatory explanation. '" 80
That meant that McDonnell Douglas's process of elimination could again be
used to draw an inference of discrimination. Second, in addition to
disregarding the evidence of a prima facie case and the evidence showing
defendant's reason was not worthy of credence, the evidence of age-based
comments of one decisionmaker, Chesnut, and the evidence that he was the
actual decisionmaker behind Reeves's firing had not been considered since that
evidence did not satisfy the Fifth Circuit's stringent definition of "direct"
evidence. 82 That was error: "[W]hile acknowledging 'the potentially damning
[Iln entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court should review all of the
evidence in the record. In doing so, however, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence .... Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all
evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe .... That is, the
court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that "evidence
supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that
that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses."
Id. at 150-51 (citations omitted).
'0 Id. at 152.
81 In a criminal case, Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187, 189 (1997), the Court described
inference drawing:
[Evidence] has a force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces come together a
narrative gains momentum, with power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the
willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest
verdict. This persuasive power of the concrete and particular is often essential to the capacity of
jurors to satisfy the obligations that the law places on them .... A syllogism is not a story ....
Telling a compelling story is an important part of convincing a jury how to decide a case. Todd E. Pettys,
Evidentiary Relevance, Morally Reasonable Verdicts, and Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REv. 467, 472
(2001), describes the decision process as follows:
[i]urors generally want to do what they believe is morally right .... jurors are most likely to be
persuaded when they are told a compelling story, and... a trial lawyer must be attuned to jurors'
beliefs and expectations. Every good trial lawyer knows, for example, that she maximizes the
likelihood of victory if she tells the jurors a credible story that makes them feel morally
compelled to return a verdict for her client.
Contemporary evidence theorists argue that imagination is a crucial part of the process of drawing inferences
that pulls the story together. See, e.g., Vein R. Walker, Theories of Uncertainty: Explaining the Possible
Sources of Error in Inferences, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1559-70 (2001) (explaining how jurors may derive
conclusions from incomplete or conflicting evidence by using imagination).
82 This approach of the Fifth Circuit was based on the boundary between McDonnell Douglas and Price
Waterhouse cases. To utilize the Price Waterhouse approach, the plaintiff had to point to "direct" evidence of
discrimination. According to the Fifth Circuit, that was evidence that proved intent to discriminate without the
need to draw any inferences. Given that state of mind cannot be directly observed, arguably no plaintiff could
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nature' of Chesnut's age-related comments, the court discounted them on the
ground that they 'were not made in the direct context of Reeves's
termination. '83  The Supreme Court further concluded that "the court also
failed to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of [Reeves]. 84  The contrast
with Hazen Paper is clear. In Hazen Paper, evidence that the plaintiff's
vesting of pension rights was within weeks of occurring could only support
drawing an inference of ERISA discrimination and could not, therefore, be
used to draw an inference of age discrimination. Now, in Reeves, the fact that
some evidence did not satisfy Price Waterhouse did not disqualify that
evidence from being relevant in a McDonnell Douglas case. Evidence could
be used to support any theory or method of proof as long as it was probative of
the ultimate issue of defendant's intent to discriminate.
By requiring lower courts to consider, rather than disregard, all of the
plaintiff's evidence in the record when deciding the defendant's motions for
summary judgment and for judgment as a matter of law-and by reviewing
satisfy the court's definition of "direct" evidence and so plaintiffs could never utilize Price Waterhouse. Even
if slightly watered down to mean admissions against the defendant's interest, few cases would qualify for
analysis pursuant to Price Waterhouse. With Price Waterhouse not applicable, the default method of analysis
was McDonnell Douglas. In Reeves, the Fifth Circuit then held that ageist comments that did not satisfy its
strict definition of "direct" evidence for a Price Waterhouse case were, therefore, not probative as
circumstantial evidence of intent to discriminate in a McDonnell Douglas case.
83 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 152-53. Thus, so-called "stray comment" evidence is circumstantial evidence of
intent to discriminate. See Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 2001); Dominguez-
Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 n.6 (1 st Cir. 2000); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless
Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (lst Cir. 2000); Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, Inc., 235 F.3d 219, 225-26 (5th
Cir. 2000); Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 922 (8th Cir. 2000). But see Stone v. Autoliv ASP,
Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2000) ("Age-related comments referring directly to the plaintiff can
support an inference of age discrimination, but 'isolated [or] ambiguous comments' may be, as here, too
abstract to support such an inference.") (alteration in original); Laina Rose Reinsmith, Note, Proving an
Employer's Intent: Disparate Treatment Discrimination and the Stray Remarks Doctrine After Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, 55 VAND. L. REv. 219, 255 (2002) (arguing that stray remarks evidence should
be treated the same as other circumstantial evidence).
84 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 152. In addition to disregarding the evidence of defendant's ageist comments, the
lower court also erred in how it evaluated other evidence:
And the court discredited petitioner's evidence that Chesnut was the actual decisionmaker by
giving weight to the fact that there was "no evidence to suggest that any of the other
decisionmakers were motivated by age." Moreover, the other evidence on which the court
relied--that Caldwell and Oswalt were also cited for poor recordkeeping, and that respondent
employed many managers over age 50-although relevant, is certainly not dispositive .... In
concluding that these circumstances so overwhelmed the evidence favoring petitioner that no
rational trier of fact could have found that petitioner was fired because of his age, the Court of
Appeals impermissibly substituted its judgment concerning the weight of the evidence for the
jury's.
Id. at 152-53 (internal citations omitted).
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that evidence carefully to draw all inferences that favor the plaintiff-the Court
in Reeves both allowed McDonnell Douglas to continue to function and opened
a path toward treating the litigation of individual discrimination cases the way
civil litigation is treated generally. By rejecting the "pretext-plus" rule, which
implicitly rejects the use of circumstantial evidence, and by rejecting the
slicing and dicing away of circumstantial evidence, Justice O'Connor took
important steps to redirect individual disparate treatment law toward a more
holistic approach. This is directly at odds with the same slice and dice
approach Justice O'Connor herself used in Hazen Paper and the Court took in
Hicks.
When it was first decided, Reeves could have been yet another narrow case
because, in one sense, it merely reaffirmed Hicks and then applied that holding
to the facts of the case. 85 It could also be viewed as another decision, like
O'Connor, that cut back a lower court that had simply gone too far in
restricting anti-discrimination law. But, in fact, the effect of the Court's
decision in Reeves should be seen as much more significant. The Fifth Circuit
had in effect judicially nullified Title VII's prohibition of individual disparate
treatment discrimination. That court's treatment of Price Waterhouse and
McDonnell Douglas, separately and then together, had foreclosed most
plaintiffs from getting a chance to prove their cases. First, given the Fifth
Circuit's very strict definition of "direct" evidence, there were extremely few
Price Waterhouse cases that could get to trial since so little evidence qualified
as "direct. ' 86  Second, the evidence of sexist or racist comments by the
employer that did not qualify as "direct" evidence was also deemed
nonprobative. as "circumstantial" evidence when the case proceeded as a
McDonnell Douglas case.87  By not qualifying as "direct" evidence, this
evidence was simply disregarded as if it had been dropped from the record of
the case. Third, the evidence proving the plaintiff's prima facie case was also
dropped from the case, along with the presumption of discrimination, once the
defendant introduced evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for its action.
88
85 Of course, some of what have become classic decisions transforming the law have been deceptively
mild in their statements. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916) (where Judge
Cardozo set up the modem law of products liability).
86 Zimmer, Leading by Example, supra note 72, at 182.
87 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 153; see also Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1218-19 (5th Cir.
1995) (concluding that a supervisor's statements to the plaintiff that he wanted to replace with a "younger and
cheaper" worker and to a coworker that he was "going to get rid of the older employees with higher salaries"
was not direct evidence of discrimination).
88 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143.
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The "pretext-plus" rule then required plaintiff to introduce additional evidence
in order to get to a jury. But, with the circumstantial evidence of racist, sexist,
or ageist comments found nonprobative, it is not clear what that evidence could
be. This nest of interrelated rules operated to deny most plaintiffs a trial or a
verdict in their behalf after trial. The Supreme Court in Reeves changed this,
though it did so in the relatively mild manner of applying the facts of the case
to the general rules concerning motions for judgment as a matter of law.
In sum, O'Connor and Reeves were both unanimous decisions of the Court.
Both rejected unduly restrictive approaches to individual discrimination that
the lower courts had adopted in line with the Court's earlier decisions in Hicks
and Hazen Paper. Looking at each case individually, the message the Court
may have been sending was simply that the lower courts in these particular
instances had cut back more than the Court intended in its decisions in Hicks
and Hazen Paper. But, looking across all three decisions, 89 it is possible to see
that the Court was doing more than that. These decisions may foreshadow a
seismic shift in the Court's approach away from its earlier decisions in Hicks
and Hazen Paper and perhaps away from McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.
As will be seen, a parallel development appears to be occurring in the
alternative method of proving individual disparate treatment discrimination
that began with Price Waterhouse, led to the addition of §§ 703(m) and
706(g)(2)(B) to Title VII, and then to Desert Palace.
II. PRICE WATERHOUSE AND THE "DIRECT" METHOD OF PROVING
DISCRIMINATION
A new method of proving discrimination had its genesis in 1989 in the
Supreme Court's split decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.90  The
plurality opinion by Justice Brennan would find liability when plaintiff
established that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was "a motivating
part" in defendant's decision but would then allow the defendant to escape
liability completely if it could prove "that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role."91 Had Justice
89 The third decision is Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), in which the Court rejected
the idea that a complaint must plead the McDonnell Douglas elements in order to withstand a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be established. Notice pleading suffices. Id.
90 490 U.S. 228 (1989). See generally Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court
and Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1, 51 n.274 (1990) (proposing
that lower courts would follow Justice O'Connor's approach).
91 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45. This approach to so-called mixed-motive cases has a history
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Brennan garnered a majority, Price Waterhouse would have drastically
expanded the possibilities for plaintiffs to prove discrimination, even if the
exact relationship between McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse was
unclear. 92 To construct a decision of the Court, however, it was necessary to
look to one of the concurring opinions. 93 In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor
raised the level of showing from the plurality's "a motivating part" to "a
substantial factor., 94  More important, she required the plaintiff to introduce
"direct evidence of intentional discrimination" in order to use the "a substantial
factor" test of liability.95  This created a new method of proving individual
disparate treatment discrimination that was independent of McDonnell
Douglas. In dissent, Justice Kennedy characterized the holding of the Court in
terms of Justice O'Connor's concurrence:
I read the opinions as establishing that in a limited number of cases
Title VII plaintiffs, by presenting direct and substantial evidence of
discriminatory animus, may shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant to show that an adverse employment decision would have
been supported by legitimate reasons. The shift in the burden of
persuasion occurs only where a plaintiff proves by direct evidence
that an unlawful motive was a substantial factor actually relied upon
in making the decision.96
The lower courts basically followed Justice O'Connor's approach as suggested
by Justice Kennedy.
97
preceding Price Waterhouse. In Mt. Healthy School District Board of Education v. Doyle, the Court used an
approach similar to Price Waterhouse in a case in which a public school teacher claimed he had been fired
because he exercised his free speech rights. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Wright Line, the National Labor
Relations Board established a similar way to deal with mixed-motive cases involving union discrimination.
251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (lst Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court, in NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., held that Wright Line was a permissible interpretation of the National
Labor Relations Act. 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
92 See Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination
Litigation, 30 GA. L. REv. 563, 579-83 (1996).
93 In his concurrence, Justice White agreed with Justice O'Connor that the plaintiff needs to show that
gender was "a substantial factor" in the defendant's decision in order to justify shifting the burden of
persuasion to the defendant to prove the same-decision defense to liability. He did not say that the plaintiff
needed to point to direct evidence in order to utilize the "a substantial factor" test.
94 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265-66. Justice White's concurrence agreed with the substantial factor
level proposed by Justice O'Connor. Id. at 259.
95 Id. at 276. Justice White did not indicate in his concurrence that he would require the introduction of
direct evidence to use the substantial factor showing to establish liability.
96 Id. at 280.
97 See generally Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 90.
[Vol. 53
HeinOnline  -- 53 Emory L.J. 1910 2004
THE NEW DISCRIMINATION LAW
As of 1989, therefore, there were two different methods of analyzing
individual disparate treatment cases: McDonnell Douglas and Price
Waterhouse. This model dominated Title VII litigation in the lower courts for
more than a decade. This bifurcated approach to individual discrimination
cases made sense for the first two years after Price Waterhouse was decided,
but it became curious in light of Congress' expansion of Price Waterhouse in
its amendments to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.98 Congress added
new §§ 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B) to develop the Price Waterhouse approach in
an even more plaintiff-friendly manner.99  Section 703(m) provides that
plaintiff can establish liability by proving that "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice. '" ° "A motivating factor"
means that race or gender played any role, however minor, in the employer's
decision.IW°  This changed Price Waterhouse in two ways. First, the "a
motivating factor" level of showing adopted the plurality's approach in place
of the concurring opinion's "substantial factor" test. Second, the amendment
changed the consequences of that showing. Price Waterhouse merely created
a presumption of discrimination subject to the affirmative, same-decision
defense, which was a full defense to liability. Under the amended statute,
proving that race or gender was "a motivating factor" for the employer's
98 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
99 Section 107 of the Act amends Title VII to include §§ 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
(2)(5) (2000). Describing the link between the defendant's conduct and discrimination as one involving the
showing of "a motivating factor" adds for the first time to Title VII an explicit reference to the state of mind or
intent of the employer. Id.
'00 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). By using the term, "motivating" in §§ 703(m) and
706(g)(2)(B), Congress for the first time expressly added a state of mind element in Title VII.
101 The House report on the bill that became the 1991 Civil Rights Act provides:
To establish liability under proposed Subsection 703[m], the complaining party must demonstrate
that discrimination actually contributed to or was otherwise a factor in an employment decision
or action. Thus, in providing liability for discrimination that is a "contributing factor," the
Committee intends to restore the rule applied in many federal circuits prior to the Price
Waterhouse decision that an employer may be held liable for any discrimination that is actually
shown to play a role in a contested employment decision.
H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 48 (1991) (emphasis in original). The change from "contributing factor" as
referred to above to "motivating factor" was not intended to suggest any change in concept. In the House
report accompanying the bill as finally passed by Congress, the change is described as follows: "The
substitute's new language changes the grounds upon which an individual may bring suit against a company for
discriminatory intent from that intent being a 'contributing' factor to a 'motivating' factor. This change is
cosmetic and will not materially change the courts'findings." 137 CONG. REC. H3922, 3944-45 (daily ed.
June 5, 1991) (emphasis added); see also Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse
Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 859, 893-95 (2004).
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decision established liability. The affirmative defense merely allowed the
defendant to limit the plaintiff's full remedies. Thus, if the plaintiff establishes
liability using the "a motivating factor" approach, defendant has the
opportunity to limit remedies, though not escape liability, by proving
according to § 706(g)(2)(B), that it "would have taken the same action in the
absence of the impermissible motivating factor."' 0 2 The new provisions make
no mention of the "direct" evidence requirement that had been required by
most lower courts' reading of Price Waterhouse.
The lower courts, however, generally viewed the amendments as leaving
the bifurcated approach of McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse intact
while liberalizing the Price Waterhouse strand. Thus, they accepted that
Congress had lowered the threshold showing from Justice O'Connor's
"substantial factor" to the "a motivating factor" test and had shifted the
consequences of a defendant successfully carrying out the same-decision
defense from a defense to liability to a diminution of full remedies. But most
courts held that the plaintiff still had to have "direct" evidence of
discrimination in order to utilize the approach that § 703(m) added to Title
VII.10 3 Absent plaintiff pinpointing some "direct" evidence, the McDonnell
Douglas method based on "circumstantial" evidence continued to be applied
by default. Price Waterhouse also came to be known as the "mixed-motive"
test, since it provided for liability even though the employer acted with more
than one motive, as long as one motive was discrimination.
Creating two separate methods of analysis and drawing the boundary
between them based on the characterization of "direct" evidence set up a
structure for individual disparate treatment law that proved impossible to
implement coherently. The evidence in every individual discrimination case
had to be parsed to determine if any of it qualified as "direct" evidence. If
enough "direct" evidence was found, the case would proceed as a Price
Waterhouse case. The "a motivating factor" level of showing would establish
liability, but there would also be the possibility that the defendant could prove
the same-decision defense to deny plaintiff full remedies. In the absence of
"direct" evidence of discrimination, the default method of analysis was
McDonnell Douglas, which would require the plaintiff to prove that
102 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(B) (2000). While the provision uses the language "same action," this is a
classic example of a same-decision defense.
103 See, e.g., Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636, 640-41 (8th Cir. 2002); Fernandes v. Costa Bros.
Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st Cir. 1999); Trotter v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 91 F.3d 1449, 1453-
54 (1th Cir. 1996); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995).
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discrimination played a role in and was the determinative influence in the
employer's decision.10 4 Such a bifurcation might have worked if the boundary
between the two methods of analysis was coherent. But the lower courts could
not begin to agree on what constituted "direct" evidence.
10 5
By mid-nineteenth century, classical evidence theory had rejected the
usefulness of the concept of "direct" evidence. ° 6  That is because "direct"
evidence, if it means anything, must prove the fact at issue without the need to
draw any inferences.' 0 7  This is hard to apply to most facts that are legally
relevant. It is impossible to apply to certain facts. The principal fact at issue
in individual discrimination cases is the employer's intent to discriminate, or,
in other words, its state of mind. There is, however, no method for directly
observing a person's state of mind. 10 8  Therefore, even if "direct" evidence
might be a useful concept in some other contexts, 1°9 it cannot apply to
anyone's state of mind."l0 Nevertheless, several courts appear to have adopted
this classical test and then, not surprisingly, found outrageously discriminatory
statements by employers not to satisfy their strict definition of "direct"
evidence. 1' In these circuits, plaintiffs were typically left to use the default
McDonnell Douglas method. 112 Other courts adopted a broader view of
104 See Jones v. Union Pac. R.R., 302 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that McDonnell Douglas
requires that plaintiff show impermissible motive was the "determining factor").
105 See generally Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: A
Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REv. 651 (2000).
106 Evidence theory rejected the distinction between "direct" and "circumstantial" evidence in the
nineteenth century. See Zimmer, supra note 92, at 613-16.
'0' Id. at 614-15.
108 Many of us lack capacity to know our own state of mind at any particular moment much less be able to
observe the state of mind of another. Lie detector tests supposedly uncover liars. But they work by measuring
galvanic skin responses triggered by nervousness. The nervousness is assumed to be triggered by lying.
Flunking a lie detector test is at best circumstantial evidence of lying because it is necessary to draw several
inferences-that lying makes the liar nervous and that nervousness causes a galvanic skin response. Skilled
liars may not get nervous when they lie and truth tellers may get nervous when given a test challenging their
veracity.
109 A classic example would be an eyewitness, in a case charging the defendant with driving through a red
light, testifying that the light was red when the defendant's car entered the intersection. Even this requires,
however, a conclusion that the witness is testifying truthfully as a threshold to accepting as fact that the
defendant did drive through the red light.
l o See Zimmer, supra note 92, at 602-04; Sullivan, supra note 31, at 1118-19.
... E.g., Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 1999) (manager's statement calling
the plaintiff an "incompetent nigger" within a day of his firing her was not direct evidence); Idurante v. Local
705, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 160 F.3d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1998) (decisionmakers statement that "all Italians
were going to be fired" was not direct evidence).
112 And in "pretext-plus" jurisdictions, such as the Fifth Circuit in Reeves, the plaintiff would lose at the
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law stages without evidence in addition to proof of a prima
facie case and proof that defendant's asserted reason for its decision was not true.
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"direct" evidence sufficient to trigger the use of Price Waterhouse, but those
approaches, however phrased, really amounted to a showing of very good
circumstantial evidence. 113  Those courts recognized that there was no real
"direct" evidence of discriminatory intent. Therefore a broader definition of
"direct" evidence was necessary if the Price Waterhouse method of proving
discrimination was ever to be used.1 14 But a distinction between circumstantial
evidence and very good circumstantial evidence is no more stable than the
distinction between "direct" and "circumstantial" evidence. In a word,
individual discrimination cases sank into a quagmire. Placing evidence in
"direct," "very good circumstantial," or "circumstantial" piles was impossible
to do in any coherent way. This confusion set the stage for Desert Palace.
III. DESERT PALACE, INC. V. COSTA: 115 THE DECISION
Catharina Costa was a trailblazer. She was the only woman working in a
warehouse, where she operated a forklift and pallet jacks.11 6 Challenging her
discharge that the employer said resulted from escalating disciplinary
sanctions, Costa introduced evidence of unequal treatment.1 7 She showed, for
example, that when men were late for work, they were given overtime to make
up the time lost; even when she was only a minute late, she was issued a
written reprimand. Men were given overtime to make up for time lost for
medical reasons; she was disciplined when she missed work for medical
reasons. A male coworker was favored with the grant of overtime because he
"had a family to support." She was singled out for "intense 'stalking' by one
of her supervisors." Supervisors began to "stack" her disciplinary record in
order to bring "this problem with Costa to a 'head."' There was also testimony
that she was the victim of sexual stereotyping, including being called "the lady
113 See, e.g., Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d. 457, 470 (3d Cir. 1993); Ostwrowski v. At. Mut. Ins.
Cos., 968 F.2d. 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992).
114 See, e.g., Deneen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 431, 436 (8th Cir. 1998); Thomas v. Nat'l
Football League Players Assn., 131 F.3d 198, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
115 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
116 For a more complete statement of the facts than are recited by the Supreme Court, see the lower court
opinions, Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d. 882 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd en banc, 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir.
2002), aff'd. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
"17 Relying on § 703(m), the plaintiff claimed discrimination because of unequal treatment. "[T]he
evidence she presented showed that Costa was definitely treated differently than her male co-workers and a
reasonable mind could conclude that it was because she was a woman." Id. at 888; see also McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (discharged white employees made Title VII claim by
showing that similarly situated black employee was not discharged for theft of property from truck dock).
Costa did not rely on either Price Waterhouse or McDonnell Douglas.
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Teamster" and a "bitch;" she was described as having "more balls than the
guys." She received a three-day suspension for complaining after the
coworker called her a "f-----.g c--t;" her coworker escaped all punishment. The
culminating event involved a physical altercation in an elevator where another
coworker shoved her against the wall, bruising her arm. As a result of this
incident, Costa was terminated, with her termination order signed by her
supervisor who had earlier expressed an intention to "get rid of that bitch.""18
Although her coworker was the aggressor, he received only a five-day
suspension for his altercation with Costa. The employer claimed he received
such a comparatively minor punishment because he had no prior disciplinary
record in his twenty-five years on the job.
At trial of the plaintiff's claim of unequal treatment because of her sex, the
trial judge gave two instructions to the jury that formed the heart of the issue
on appeal. First, without objection from the employer, the trial judge
instructed the jury with language crafted from § 703(m) of Title VII: "[T]he
plaintiff has the burden of proving.., by a preponderance of the evidence that
she 'suffered adverse work conditions' and that her sex 'was a motivating
factor in any such work conditions imposed upon her.""'1 9 Second, the trial
judge, over the defendant's objections that the plaintiff had failed to introduce
any "direct" evidence, gave an instruction tying § 703(m) to the same-decision
defense of § 706(g)(2)(B):
If you find that the plaintiffs sex was a motivating factor in the
defendant's treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your
verdict, even if you find that the defendant's conduct was also
motivated by a lawful reason.
However, if you find that the defendant's treatment of the
plaintiff was motivated by both gender and lawful reasons, you must
decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. The plaintiff is
entitled to damages unless the defendant proves by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff
118 There apparently was no attempt to treat this as "direct" evidence for purposes of invoking Price
Waterhouse.
119 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 96. The pattern civil trial instructions used in the Ninth Circuit use the "a
motivating factor" showing for all individual discrimination cases. See Manual of Model Civil Jury
Instructions for The Ninth Circuit § 12.1, 12.2 (2003) (using the "a motivating factor" standard both in
McDonnell Douglas cases, in § 12.1, and in Price Waterhouse cases, § 12.2, with mixed-motive apparently
defined as a situation where defendant introduces sufficient evidence to raise as a question of fact that it would
have made the same decision even if it had not considered a prohibited characteristic such as race or gender).
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similarly, even if the plaintiffs gender had played no role in the
employment decision. 20
The jury awarded plaintiff a verdict of $364,377.74. 121 After the trial judge
denied the employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law, 122 the employer
appealed claiming that the. trial judge erred in giving the mixed-motive
instruction in the absence of any "direct" evidence that gender motivated
Costa's discharge. A panel of the Ninth Circuit initially vacated. 23 The panel
was unanimous in accepting Desert Palace's argument that all of Costa's
evidence of gender discrimination was inferential, i.e., that it was
circumstantial. evidence requiring an inference of discrimination to be drawn.
Since there was no "direct" evidence, the plaintiff's claim should have been
assessed under the traditional McDonnell Douglas standard, not Price
Waterhouse.124  The Ninth Circuit then heard the case en banc. In a 7-4
decision, it affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. 125 Rather than
enter what was characterized as the "quagmire ' 126 over what was "direct"
evidence, the court instead looked to the language of § 703(m) and concluded
that, "the best way out of this morass is to return to the language of the statute,
which imposes no special requirement and does not reference 'direct
evidence.' ' ' 7 By downgrading the employer's same-decision defense in
§ 706(g)(2)(B) from an affirmative defense to liability to a mere limitation on
the plaintiffs remedies, Congress had abrogated "the premise for Justice
O'Connor's comment"' 128 in Price Waterhouse regarding "direct" evidence.
The en banc court thus upheld the instructions as appropriate, whether or not
"direct" evidence was introduced.
120 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 96-97. Presumably, the defendant objected not because the instruction
gave it a possible affirmative defense, but because the plaintiff would establish liability even if the employer's
asserted reason for its action (here the different disciplinary records of the two employees) was found to be the
but-for cause of defendant's action. This would be so because the jury could find that sex was "a motivating
factor" even though a very minor factor in the defendant's decision, and that would suffice to establish
liability.
121 This award was made up of $200,000 in compensatory damages, $100,000 in punitive damages, and
$64,377.74 in backpay. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d at 846.
122 The trial judge, however, granted a motion for remittitur and persuaded Costa to accept a 50%
reduction in compensatory damages. Id. at 846-47.
123 Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd en banc, 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002),
affd, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
124 Desert Palace, 268 F.3d at 888-89.
125 Desert Palace, 299 F.3d at 865. The remand concerned the question of the application of Kolstad v.
American Dental Ass 'n to the punitive damages award. 527 U.S. 526 (1999); see also supra note 5.
126 Desert Palace, 299 F.3d at 851.
127 ld. at 853.
128 Id. at 850-51.
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The dissent by Judge Gould viewed the 1991 amendments to Title VII as
merely amending portions of Price Waterhouse, leaving the rest unaffected.
129
He argued that "Congress, in amending Title VII, did not respond at all to
Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement."' 130  Congress did not
eliminate the "direct" evidence threshold to the application of Price
Waterhouse because the consequence-that McDonnell Douglas "would be
effectively overruled"31 -was too radical to infer from mere Congressional
silence.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, with a concurrence
by Justice O'Connor, affirmed unanimously.' 32 The first question raised was
"whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to
obtain a mixed-motive instruction under [§ 703(m)]."' 133 The answer was no.
"In order to obtain an instruction under [§ 703(m)], a plaintiff need only
present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice."" 34 Thus, "direct
evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases.
' ' 35
Reaching that conclusion was straightforward since Justice Thomas
focused on the statutory language and its plain meaning: 136
[T]he starting point for our analysis is the statutory text. And where,
as here, the words of the statute are unambiguous, the "judicial
inquiry is complete." Section [703(m)] unambiguously states that a
plaintiff need only "demonstrat[e]" that an employer used a
forbidden consideration with respect to "any employment practice."
129 Id. at 866 (Gould, J., dissenting). The vision apparently is that the judicial holding in Price
Waterhouse is somehow equivalent to a section of Title VII itself. When Congress added the new provisions,
it only changed the existing judicial interpretation by whatever explicit amendments were made in the same
way that an amendment to an existing statute is limited to the express changes added to or deleted from the
original statutory language. Judge Gould's vision was not accepted. The Supreme Court did not treat the
judicial gloss on a statute as if it were the statute itself. Instead, the Court looked at the terms of the statute
independent of any judicial gloss.
130 id.
131 Jd. at 867.
132 Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
133 Id. at 92.
134 Id. at 101.
135 Id. at 101-02.
136 Id. at 98. The Court looked at § 703(m) as a freestanding addition to Title VII. While addressing what
the Court had decided in Price Waterhouse, the amendment was to Title VII and not to its judicial
interpretation in Price Waterhouse. The Court did not even mention McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 98-99.
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On its face, the statute does not mention, much less require, that a
plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct evidence.1
37
Beyond its unambiguous terms, the way § 703(m) dovetails with the rest of
the statute suggests that Congress did not intend to require a "special
evidentiary showing."' 38 First, § 703(m) uses the term "demonstrate," which is
separately defined in § 701(m) as "meets the burdens of production and
persuasion."' 139 If Congress had meant to require direct evidence, it could have
included language in either §§ 701(m) or 703(g)(2)(B), as it had unequivocally
done elsewhere when that was its intent. 140  Further, if "demonstrate" were
construed to require the plaintiff to use direct evidence to establish liability
under § 703(m), then it would seem to follow that the defendant would also
have to use direct evidence to prove the same-decision limitation to remedies
under § 706(g)(2)(B) because that provision also uses the term
"demonstrates."' 14 1 Since the same term would carry the same meaning in both
provisions, the Court stated: "Absent some congressional indication to the
contrary, we decline to give the same term in the same Act a different meaning
depending on whether the rights of the plaintiff or the defendant are at
issue." 142
Second, like law generally, discrimination law allows the plaintiff to prove
her case by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. 143  Significantly, the
Court very strongly endorsed the value of circumstantial evidence: "The
reason for treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and
deep-rooted: 'Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be
more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.""4
137 Id. (citations omitted). For an early argument for the result in Desert Palace based on the plain
meaning of the statute, see Zimmer, supra note 92, at 602-04.
138 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 99.
'9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (2000). Section 105 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act also codified the disparate
impact theory of discrimination in Title VII by adding new § 703(k), which also uses the term "demonstrates"
to define the burdens of proof and persuasion for plaintiffs and defendants in disparate impact cases. Reading
a "direct" evidence requirement into the prima facie case and defense to a disparate impact case would make
the entire provision incoherent if "direct" included a state of mind notion in it.
'4o See 42 U.S.C. § I 158(a)(2)(B) ("demonstrates by clear, and convincing evidence" for asylum
application); id. § 5851(b)(3)(D) (same-decision defense to whistleblower claim must be "demonstrate[d] by
clear and convincing evidence").
141 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100-01. It is not clear that this would, in fact, pose much of a problem.
Defendant could introduce testimony of its decisionmaker that she did not discriminate but would have made
the same decision even if she had.
142 Id. at 101 (citation omitted).
141 See id. at 99.
144 Id. at 100 (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500,508 n.17 (1957)).
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Justice O'Connor, whose concurrence in Price Waterhouse created the
dichotomy between "direct" and "circumstantial" evidence, concurred briefly
in Desert Palace to explain her position. At the oral argument, she appeared
almost surprised that her use of the term "direct" in Price Waterhouse had
subsequently taken on such significance.145  As she indicated during the oral
argument, her concurrence stated that Congress simply had changed the law
when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In enacting § 703(m), "Congress
codified a new evidentiary rule for mixed-motive cases arising under Title
VII.' 14 6  Since Congress did not specifically incorporate her direct evidence
requirement in the new provision, it was not part of the law.
Desert Palace is short and sweet. By focusing just on the interpretation of
§ 703(m), the Court did not reach broader questions or the potential
implications of what it did decide. In one footnote, the Court appeared to be
claiming that its decision was narrow: "This case does not require us to decide
when, if ever, [§ 703(m)] applies outside of the mixed-motive context."'
147
145 The context is the colloquy between Justice O'Connor and Mark Ricciardi, the lawyer for the
employer, about the source of the "direct" evidence requirement in Price Waterhouse:
QUESTION: What-what was it-the it [requirement of direct evidence] that was said in Price
Waterhouse? Not in the-not in the plurality opinion. The direct evidence rle doesn't come
out of the plurality-
QUESTION: Concurring opinion.
MR. RICCIARDI: Well-
QUESTION: It came out of a concurring opinion that bore my name, did it not?
(Laughter.)
MR. RICCIARDI: That is correct, Your Honor.
QUESTION: Yes. And I don't think it appeared in the plurality opinion, nor in Justice White's
concurring opinion, did it?
MR. RICCIARDI: No, it did not. Your Honor. What I believe the-
QUESTION: I know a number of courts have followed it, but I-it's hard to extract a-rule
under those circumstances.
MR. RICCIARDI: I-I-
QUESTION: Congress, in making its amendments in 1991, did not mention anything about
direct evidence, did it?
MR. RICCIARDI: No, it did not, Your Honor.
Oral Argument, No. 02-679 (Apr. 21, 2003) (Oral Argument of Mark J. Ricciardi on Behalf of the Petitioner in
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa), 2003 WL 20011040, at 8-9. In making the comment that it is hard to extract a
rule in this situation, Justice O'Connor may be referring to the difficulty of applying the "narrowest grounds"
doctrine, where no single rationale commands the votes of a majority of Justices. That doctrine was advanced
in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
146 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 102 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
147 Id. at 94 n. 1. Since the Court decided that "direct" evidence was not necessary in order to pursue a
case under § 703(m), it also did not need to answer the second question on which it had granted certiorari:
"What are the appropriate standards for lower courts to follow in making a direct evidence determination in
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In sum, the plain meaning of § 703(m) carried the day and that appears to
doom any independent significance for the Price Waterhouse method of
proof. 1
48
IV. PRICE WATERHOUSE Is DEAD
As the separation of the two methods of analysis of individual
discrimination cases evolved, Price Waterhouse came to be identified by the
nomenclature as the "direct" evidence method or the "mixed-motive" method
of proof. With the death of the "direct" evidence requirement announced in
Desert Palace, the question is whether Price Waterhouse retains any
significance independent of the application of § 703(m). If there is any, it
presumably would lie in viewing Price Waterhouse as involving "mixed-
motive" cases. 14 9  Instead of applying only where the plaintiff can point to
"direct" evidence, Desert Palace makes clear that § 703(m) at least applies to
all situations that can be characterized as involving mixed-motives. It is,
'mixed-motive' cases under Title VII?" Id. at 101 n.3. The question of what "direct" evidence was had been
rendered irrelevant. Perhaps the difficulty of answering that second question influenced the Court in how it
decided the first question.
148 Since Desert Palace was a Title VII case and since §§ 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B) amend only Title VII,
the issues connected with the possible application of Desert Palace to Title VII retaliation cases as well as
ADEA and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 cases are beyond the scope of this paper. See Estades-Negroni v. Assocs. Corp.
N. Am., 345 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2003) (applying Desert Palace to ADEA cases).
149 One argument is that the Court's approach in Desert Palace is so centered on the language of § 703(m)
that it leaves Price Waterhouse untouched as an interpretation of § 703(a). Justice Thomas's opinion is
structured in a way that could support this separation of § 703(m) from Price Waterhouse as a § 703(a) case.
Part L.A of the opinion lays out the background leading up to the enactment of § 107 of the 1991 Act, including
the fact that Congress was responding to Price Waterhouse. Part 1.B then discusses the case at hand, while
Part H deals with the interpretation of § 703(m), citing Price Waterhouse only in the context of the ultimately
unsuccessful arguments the employer raised.
The separation of Price Waterhouse from § 703(m) would essentially mean that there would now be two
approaches to Title VII cases involving mixed-motives--the traditional Price Waterhouse approach and
§ 703(m). Justice Thomas' opinion, however, appears to have foreclosed that by the following footnote, "This
case does not require us to decide when, if ever, § 107 [of the 1991 Civil Rights Act that added §§ 703(m) and
706(g)(2)(B) to Title VII] applies outside of the mixed-motive context." Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94 n. 1.
While in one sense indicating a limit to the potential scope of application of the Court's decision to only
mixed-motive cases, in another sense this language supports the conclusion that § 703(m) does apply
whenever a case is inside the mixed-motive context, whether under § 703(m) or § 703(a). Further, even if in
some abstract sense both the traditional Price Waterhouse method and § 703(m) had continued independent
existence as two separate methods of dealing with mixed-motive cases, no plaintiff would have an incentive to
pick the more difficult and risky Price Waterhouse approach over § 703(m). The holding in Desert Palace
appears to put that decision in the hands of the plaintiff. Finally, it is reasonably clear that in adopting § 107 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress was addressing issues raised by the Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse and that Desert Palace explains the effect of that legislation on prior case law.
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therefore, no longer appropriate to characterize mixed-motive cases as those
involving "direct" evidence. It is, however, appropriate to characterize all
cases involving "mixed-motives" as § 703(m) cases, even though they can now
be proved using circumstantial, direct, or a combination of circumstantial and
direct evidence. With "direct" evidence irrelevant and "mixed-motive" cases
governed by § 703(m), there is nothing distinctive left about the Price
Waterhouse method of proof. 150  In other words, there is no longer any reason
to characterize any individual discrimination case brought under Title VII as a
Price Waterhouse case since that appellation adds nothing beyond what
§§ 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B) provide. In short, Price Waterhouse is dead. 15 1
The next question is the potential scope of application of Desert Palace
beyond "mixed-motive" cases, a question not addressed by the Court. That
question is another way of asking whether McDonnell Douglas has also died,
with the consequence that all Title VII individual disparate treatment cases will
be treated as § 703(m) cases.
150 What does remain of Price Waterhouse is its holding that evidence of the decisionmakers' use of
stereotypical language concerning the plaintiff is circumstantial evidence of discrimination. In that case, Dr.
Susan Fiske, a social psychologist and psychology professor, testified that, based on the overt sex-based
comments as well as even some gender-neutral remarks of some of the decisionmakers, the promotion process
used by defendant was "likely influenced by sex stereotyping." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
235 (1989). Stereotyping has long been held to be discriminatory. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S.
604, 611-12 (1993) (stereotypes about older workers are the essence of age discrimination); City of L.A. Dep't
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978) ("It is now well recognized that employment
decisions cannot be predicated on mere 'stereotyped' impressions about the characteristics of males or
females.").
151 At least for Title VII individual disparate treatment cases-it is beyond the scope of this Article to
address the effect, if any, of Desert Palace's interpretation of § 703(h) on, age discrimination cases.
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V. DOES MCDONNELL DOUGLAS SURVIVE?
152
If the § 703(m) method governs whenever a case involves mixed-motives,
even if all the evidence is circumstantial, does McDonnell Douglas survive
Desert Palace? And, if McDonnell Douglas survives, what role does it now
play in individual disparate treatment discrimination law? At the broadest, the
argument that McDonnell Douglas died along with Price Waterhouse is as
follows: Since Desert Palace destroyed the boundary between McDonnell
Douglas and Price Waterhouse by eliminating the "direct" evidence threshold
to the use of the Price Waterhouse theory, the dichotomy between the two
methods itself collapses, merging them into one. To say it another way, after
Desert Palace, circumstantial evidence alone, direct evidence alone, or a
combination of the two can all be used in all § 703(m) cases-which means at
least every case involving mixed-motives. And if, after Reeves, circumstantial
evidence, direct evidence,' 53 or a combination can be used in every McDonnell
Douglas case, the two methods have collapsed into one. That method is the "a
motivating factor" test of liability established in § 703(m).
This is a powerful argument. But it is predicated on the notion that all that
separated the two methods was the type of evidence plaintiff needed to make
out a case: By removing the "direct" evidence boundary between Price
Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas cases, there no longer is a distinction
between § 703(m) cases involving "mixed-motives" and McDonnell Douglas
cases. The question remains, however, whether there is another boundary-
with § 703(m) cases involving mixed-motives and McDonnell Douglas cases
152 Professor Davis argues that McDonnell Douglas lives. See Davis, supra note 6, at 859, 862. While
the "a motivating factor" test applies to all individual discrimination cases, the "single-motive" notion means
that McDonnell Douglas and not the "mixed-motive" approach of § 703(m) applies if the plaintiff is proving
pretext, with pretext meaning that the plaintiff must prove the employer's asserted reason played no role in the
challenged decision. Thus, that is a "single-motive" case. Professor Corbett argues that Desert Palace killed
McDonnell Douglas in the sense that its "determinative influence" level of showing was replaced with
§ 703(m)'s "a motivating factor" showing. See Corbett, supra note 6, at 199-200. Therefore, they both agree
that the "a motivating factor" test applies to all individual disparate treatment cases brought under Title VII.
In The Supreme Court, 2002 Term, 117 HARv. L. REV. 400, 407 (2003), the assessment of Desert
Palace's impact on McDonnell Douglas appears to support the position of Professor Davis that the plaintiff
must prove "that the claimed legitimate motive never entered the employer's calculus." But with § 703(m)
being available, plaintiffs will no longer bring pretext claims because of the easier burden of persuasion
available with the "a motivating factor" standard under the mixed-motive framework. The change in focus
from McDonnell Douglas to § 703(m) is "a welcome development." Id. at 409.
153 Reeves involved ageist comments characterized as circumstantial evidence, at least as evaluated under
the strict definition followed in the Fifth Circuit. In other circuits, that same evidence may well have been
characterized as "direct" enough to justify the use of the Price Waterhouse method of analysis.
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involving only single motives, or whether some distinction remains based on
the characterization of McDonnell Douglas as involving "pretext." The
distinction between single and mixed-motives, while not robust in the cases, is
reflected in the nomenclature "mixed-motive," used to describe Price
Waterhouse cases and by the Desert Palace Court, to describe § 703(m) cases.
The next section of the Article will discuss whether McDonnell Douglas
involves "single-motives." The section following will address the consistency
of the "a motivating factor" standard with but-for causation. The final section
of this part will discuss the residual meaning to the description of McDonnell
Douglas as involving "pretext."
A. McDonnell Douglas Cases Do Not Involve "Single-Motives"
It has been true virtually from the beginning that McDonnell Douglas does
not actually require a showing that discrimination is the "single motive" of the
employer in order to establish liability. While, of course, a factfinder can find
that a particular employer's decision was based on just one reason,154 there can
be liability in McDonnell Douglas cases even if the employer's action is not
motivated just by one discriminatory reason. One of the holdings in Price
Waterhouse is that Congress did not intend to establish a sole cause standard
under Title VII because it had rejected an amendment that would have set a
sole cause standard of liability.155 So, the plaintiff never needs to prove that
discrimination was the only motive or cause of the employer's challenged
action. That means that liability can be established in all Title VII cases with a
showing that is less than sole cause. If liability is established with something
less than sole cause, a reason or motive in addition to discrimination can have
played a role in the employer's decision but the plaintiff can still win.
56
Traditionally, the first level of showing short of sole cause is but-for cause.
That is, using a but-for or determinative factor standard, plaintiff can win with
a showing that is less than sole cause, less than proving that discrimination was
the "single motive." She wins even if the factfinder finds another reason is
154 The plaintiff wins if a jury would find that discrimination was the single motive for the employer's
decision and defendant would win when if a jury would find that the nondiscriminatory reason asserted by the
defendant was the single motive for the action. The question is what happens when the factfinder believes the
reason asserted by the defendant played a role in its decision but so did discrimination.
155 Price Waterhouse, at 490 U.S. at 241 n.7. A "sole cause" level of showing was rejected in McDonnell
Douglas cases in Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 593-94 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc).
156 Even if the plaintiff need not prove discrimination was the sole cause of her harm, there is an
argument, addressed below, that she does have to prove that the defendant's asserted nondiscriminatory reason
played no part in the action she challenges.
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involved, as long as discrimination is the but-for reason or the determinative
influence for the employer's action. Liability will be established as long as the
decision would not have been made but-for the gender (or race, etc.) of the
plaintiff.
Justice O'Connor has articulated this standard both in her concurrence in
Price Waterhouse and in her opinion for the Court in Hazen Paper. For
example, in Price Waterhouse, one of her stated reasons for not joining the
plurality was the language of Justice Brennan suggesting the words "because
of' did not mean "but-for."' 57 She thought that the plurality's approach was
inconsistent with the intent of Congress in enacting Title VII: "The legislative
history of Title VII bears out what its plain language suggests: a substantive
violation of the statute only occurs when consideration of an illegitimate
criterion is the 'but-for' cause of an adverse employment action."1 58 In Hazen
Paper, a McDonnell Douglas case, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court,
articulated "a determinative influence" standard: "[A] disparate treatment
claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually played a
role in that [decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence on the
outcome."
' 159
While Justice O'Connor was concerned that a showing of less than but-for
or determinative influence could too easily lead to liability, neither she nor the
Court demanded any more than such a showing to establish liability. Thus,
using the but-for or determinative influence test, liability can be found in a
McDonnell Douglas case-even though more than a single cause is found to
have motivated the employer-as long as discrimination was the but-for or
determinative influence in the decision.1 60  More concretely, the employer's
asserted reason can have played a role in the decision as long as the decision
would not have been made but for discrimination. That means that the
description of McDonnell Douglas as involving a "single motive" has, at least
157 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262-63 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
158 Id. at 262. The issue ultimately is the employer's state of mind, its motivation, but causation is a way
of talking about linking that state of mind to the action it took. See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 90, at 47-48;
Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motive Problem in Employment
Discrimination Law, 70 TEx. L. REV. 17, 19-20 (1991).
159 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). "Determinative influence" or "determinative
factor" is quite close to "but-for" causation. Professor Davis argues that there is only one standard for all
individual discrimination cases, the "a motivating factor" test, and that it would be illogical to vary the level of
showing depending on the evidence in the case. See Davis, supra note 6, at 861-63.
160 While but-for causation requires a finding that the employer would not have made its decision if
discrimination had not been involved, there can be liability if some other reason was implicated as a motive for
the employer's action so long as discrimination was the determinative influence.
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since Hazen Paper, been metaphorical.161 Thus, with no requirement that
plaintiff prove discrimination was the single motive for the decision, there is
no basis for a dichotomy between "single motive" McDonnell Douglas cases
and "mixed-motive" § 703(m) cases. In short, under McDonnell Douglas as
well as § 703(m), liability can be established even though the factfinder finds
that the employer's decision involved mixed-motives, as long as one of those
motives is discrimination.' 
62
Even using the determinative factor level to trigger liability-applied in the
McDonnell Douglas cases before Desert Palace-the plaintiff did not have to
prove that discrimination was the sole cause of her treatment by the defendant.
The question was whether a plaintiff, relying on McDonnell Douglas, had to
prove that the defendant's asserted nondiscriminatory action was completely
false. 16 3 Looking back at cases starting with McDonnell Douglas, there are no
clear holdings that the plaintiff must show that a defendant's reason played no
role whatsoever in the decision plaintiff challenges. In McDonnell Douglas,
the pretext stage involved a showing that the "presumptively valid reasons for
... rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.
164
Even if a reason were in some sense true, it could still be used to cover up
discrimination. An employer could scurry around to find a legitimate
complaint about the employee and assert that as its nondiscriminatory reason,
even though discrimination was the actual motivation. Burdine, however, has
language that is somewhat supportive of the notion that the plaintiff must
disprove the defendant's reason completely, but has other language that need
not be read that strictly. In describing the pretext stage, the Burdine Court said
that the plaintiff "now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the
proferred reason was not the true reason for the employment decision." 165 This
161 Professor Tristin K. Green put it this way: "[E]ven those cases in which the plaintiff proves
discrimination by proving the proffered reason false, the necessary inference is not that the defendant was
solely motivated by an impermissible factor, but that the defendant was not motivated by the proffered factor."
Tristin K. Green, Comment, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framework: Circumstantial Evidence
and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 CAL. L. REV. 983, 1004 (1999).
162 In deciding what instructions to give to the jury in a McDonnell Douglas case, the judge has to assume
the possibility that the jury will find that it involved mixed motives on the part of the defendant. While the
jury could theoretically find that discrimination was the sole cause for defendant's conduct or that the reason
asserted by the defendant is the only cause, the jury could decide that both discrimination and defendant's
asserted reason played a role. Thus, every case is potentially a mixed-motive case.
163 Professor Davis thinks that this is required in a McDonnell Douglas case. Davis, supra note 6, at 860.
164 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973).
165 Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). This language is echoed in
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187 (1989).
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sounds more like the either/or description sometimes used to describe the
McDonnell Douglas method and which supports the idea that it involves a
"single-motive." Then, however, the Court, in describing how the question of
pretext merges with the ultimate question of intent to discriminate, describes
what the plaintiff needs to show:
She now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered
reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. This
burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the
[factfinder] that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.
She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the [factfinder]
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer's proferred explanation is
unworthy of credence.
Proving the defendant's reason was "not the true reason" carries with it the
possibility that the factfinder could find that the defendant's reason played a
role but was not the only true reason for the decision. Being "unworthy of
credence" sounds less like a question of absolute denial of any involvement
and more like disbelief that the defendant's explanation is the whole story.
That language therefore supports the looser approach suggested in McDonnell
Douglas itself.
While it is clear that the plaintiff can win despite reasons other than
discrimination playing some role in the defendant's decision, it would seem
quite strange that the defendant's asserted nondiscriminatory reason could not
be among them. That would be the result if the plaintiff had to prove that the
defendant's asserted reason played absolutely no role in defendant's decision
in order to prove pretext. The reason for rejecting the sole cause standard in
the first instance is that employees who are not perfect should nevertheless be
protected from discrimination. For any plaintiff who is not perfect, the
employer might have some basis for taking action against her; that, however,
should not foreclose plaintiff from proving that she nevertheless was the victim
of discrimination. But since Desert Palace, it is even clearer that liability can
be established even if a factfinder could reasonably conclude that the reason
asserted by the employer played some role in the action plaintiff challenges, as
long as discrimination was "a motivating factor" for the action.
166 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (citation omitted).
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McDonnell Douglas is often inaccurately described as a "single motive"
method because its process of elimination can be described as asking the
factfinder to answer something like an either/or question: Was the employer's
proffered reason a nondiscriminatory one as it asserts or is it discrimination as
plaintiff asserts? Since Hicks, however, that way of describing a McDonnell
Douglas case is only a metaphor. As the Court concluded in Hicks and
reaffirmed in Reeves, the question ultimately is not the either/or question of
asking the factfinder to believe either the employer's asserted reason or the
employer's claim of discrimination. Hicks made clear that the defendant could
still win even if the factfinder found that plaintiffs prima facie case was
established and rejected the employer's asserted reason. In Hicks, for example,
the factfinder accepted plaintiff's prima facie case and rejected the reason
asserted by the employer for its actions-the severity and the accumulation of
rules violations by Hicks. Nevertheless, the factfinder, thinking that the
personal animosity of the supervisor toward Hicks was the real reason Hicks
was fired, found no liability since the plaintiff failed to convince him that
discrimination was the real reason for the employer's action.
167
In the Price Waterhouse era it made some sense to describe McDonnell
Douglas as a "single motive" test to distinguish cases using that method of
proof from the "mixed-motive" approach in Price Waterhouse-even though it
was never accurate to describe McDonnell Douglas in this way. With Price
Waterhouse supplanted by § 703(m), the courts will have to confront this
inaccurate circumlocution. Given Hicks and Desert Palace, there is no basis to
continue it. 68
167 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 542-43 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). What makes
such a finding hard to accept is that the only evidence in the record as to personal animosity was testimony by
the supervisor denying that he had any animosity toward Hicks. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp.
1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
168 Before Desert Palace, lower courts continued to use these inaccurate characterizations and rejected the
attempts of a few judges to adopt more accurate language. See, e.g., Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d
1287 (1lth Cir. 1999) (attempt by Judge Tjoflat to adopt more accurate nomenclature in individual
discrimination cases); Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 506, 599-607 (3d Cir. 1995) (Judge Greenberg,
concurring in part and in the judgment, also attempted to clarify the language used).
Judge Magnuson in the federal district of Minnesota in Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d
987, 994 (D. Minn. 2003), has taken the first plunge, rejecting any difference between § 703(m) and
McDonnell Douglas based on a difference between single and mixed-motives. Having earlier found that the
plaintiff would not be able to introduce evidence that could be characterized as "direct," the court applied
Desert Palace and held that the plaintiff was nevertheless entitled to use § 703(m)'s "a motivating factor"
standard of liability in what he characterized as a McDonnell Douglas "single motive" case. Liability could be
established using § 703(m) even if the plaintiff proved that discrimination was the single motive for the
employer's action.
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Even if courts try to maintain a distinction between "single-motive" cases
where § 703(m) does not apply and "mixed-motive" cases where it does, every
McDonnell Douglas case turns, at least potentially, into a "mixed-motive" case
once the defendant asserts a nondiscriminatory reason. During oral argument,
one of the Justices made this point in a colloquy with Costa's attorney:
QUESTION: Is-is this correct, that McDonnell Douglas survives on
your reading in a case in which the defendant does not go forward
with anything? The plaintiff puts in enough to make a prima facie
case. Defendant sits mute. McDonnell Douglas controls the result
there. If the defendant does go forward with something at that
point-and-and here I'm not sure of this, but I think-by definition,
it then becomes a mixed-motive case, doesn't it? Under [§ 7031(m)?
MR. PECCOLE: I believe it does.
169
Whether the case will actually be found to involve a single-motive or is a
mixed-motive case awaits the decision of the factfinder. Nevertheless, when
the trial judge is faced with plaintiff's evidence supporting an inference of
discrimination and defendant's evidence that it acted for a nondiscriminatory
reason, the case potentially involves mixed-motives: The factfinder could find
[Tlhe plain language of the statute allows a plaintiff to prevail if he or she can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a single, illegitimate motive was a motivating factor in an
employment decision, without having to allege that other factors also motivated the decision ....
[Blecause the Civil Rights Act of 1991 unambiguously prohibits any degree of consideration of a
plaintiffs race, gender or other enumerated classification in making an employment decision, it
must also extend to single-motive claims.
Id. at 991. More importantly, after Desert Palace, there was no longer any reason to maintain the fiction that
McDonnell Douglas cases involved single motives. Thus, the district court held that the § 703(m) "a
motivating factor" standard applies in McDonnell Douglas cases.
The dichotomy [presented to the factfinder to decide that either the action was based on the
employer's asserted reason or it was discrimination] produced by the McDonnell Douglas
framework is a false one. In practice, few employment decisions are made solely on the basis of
one rationale to the exclusion of all others. Instead, most employment decisions are the result of
the interaction of various factors, legitimate and at times illegitimate, objective and subjective,
rational and irrational. The Court does not see the efficacy in perpetuating this legal fiction
implicitly exposed by the Supreme Court's ruling in Desert Palace. When possible, this Court
seeks to avoid those machinations of jurisprudence that do not comport with common sense and
basic understandings of human interaction.
Id. at 991-92.
169 Oral Argument, No. 02-679 (Apr. 21, 2003) (Oral Argument of Mark J. Ricciardi on Behalf of the
Petitioner in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa), 2003 WL 20011040, at 34-35; see also Corbett, supra note 6, at
210 n.67.
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that the single-motive for the action was either discrimination or the reason
asserted by the defendant. 170  Rather than find that the employer's action was
either discrimination or the reason asserted by the defendant, the jury could
find that the defendant's asserted reason played some role in the decision but
that discrimination did as well. Thus, at least at the time of instructing the
jury, every McDonnell Douglas case in which defendant asserts a
nondiscriminatory reason is potentially a mixed-motive case. As such,
plaintiff is entitled to request an instruction based on § 703(m).
In sum, the distinction between "single-motive" and "mixed-motive" cases
has lost its significance as a way of describing any real difference between
§ 703(m) cases and McDonnell Douglas cases. Even if the term "single-
motive" was continued to be used metaphorically, as a practical matter, every
McDonnell Douglas case would be turned into a "mixed-motive" case and thus
a § 703(m) case once the defendant introduced evidence of its alleged
nondiscriminatory reason. The next section deals with the problem of whether
using § 703(m) for all individual disparate treatment cases undermines the but-
for standard of causation implicit in the use of the term "because of' in
§ 703(a).
B. The "A Motivating Factor" Standard Is Not Inconsistent with But-For
Cause
Once the descriptions of "direct" versus "circumstantial evidence" and
"single-motive" versus "mixed-motives" both cease to establish a boundary
between McDonnell Douglas and § 703(m), a difference that arguably remains
is the difference between the levels of showing necessary to establish
liability. 171 To establish liability, § 703(m) requires the plaintiff to prove only
that discrimination was "a motivating factor" in the employer's decision. In
170 Since Hicks, there is another possible single-motive: some reason not in the record that the factfinder
thinks explains the employer's decision.
171 Another way of stating this is to ask whether McDonnell Douglas, because its level of showing to
establish liability is the "determinative influence," retains independence as a claim upon which relief can be
granted from the claim under § 703(m) that liability is established by showing that an impermissible
characteristic was "a motivating factor." This approach is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., in which the Court found that it was wrong to apply Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6)'s failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted approach wherein the plaintiff
in an individual discrimination case failed to plead the elements of a McDonnell Douglas case. 534 U.S. 506,
510-11 (2002). Instead of treating McDonnell Douglas as a claim of relief upon which relief could be granted,
the Court decided that a simple claim by the plaintiff that he was a victim of employment discrimination
sufficed to withstand dismissal by way of Rule 12(b)(6). id. at 511-12. The adequacy of the complaint was
judged by the notice pleading standards of Rule 8(a). Id. at 512-13.
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contrast, in McDonnell Douglas cases, the courts have typically required the
plaintiff to prove that discriminatory motivation was the but-for or the
determinative influence in the employer's decision. 172
Despite those two apparently different levels of showing, proof that an
impermissible characteristic was "a motivating factor" in a §§ 703(m) and
706(g)(2)(B) case should ultimately satisfy the "determinative influence"
showing required by Hazen Paper once the shifting burdens of the plaintiff and
the defendant are taken into account. The "a motivating factor" showing
appears easier for a plaintiff to establish than the "played a role ... and had a
determinative influence" showing described in Hazen Paper. That, however,
does not make the two standards ultimately inconsistent in light of the
interaction between § 703(m)'s "a motivating factor" showing and the same-
decision defense in § 706(g)(2)(B). It is hard to find any real difference
between "a motivating factor" in § 703(m) and the first part of the Hazen
Paper formula, showing that discrimination "played a role."'173  With that
showing, the plaintiff has established liability under § 703(m). In that sense,
Title VII has created liability for conduct which does not necessarily change
any particular outcome. 174
But that does not end the matter because establishing liability operates to
shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant to prove the § 706(g)(2)(B)
same-decision defense; that is, that it "would have taken the same action in the
172 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). See Jones v. Union Pac. R.R., 302 F.3d 735,
742 (7th Cir. 2002) (McDonnell Douglas case requires showing that protected characteristic was a
"determinative factor" in the employer's decision). But see Davis, supra note 6, at 859-60.
173 Starting with the most difficult to prove and moving to the least difficult, "sole cause" is most difficult
to prove, followed by "but-for." Following "but-for" is "the determinative factor," which is followed by the
slightly nuanced, "a determinative factor." Less difficult to prove than "a determinative factor" is "the
substantial factor," followed by "a substantial factor," and then "the motivating factor," and finally the "a
motivating factor" test. Justices White and O'Connor in their concurring opinions in Price Waterhouse
thought that "a substantial factor" was more difficult to prove than the plurality's "a motivating factor." Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 259-61 (White, J., concurring); id. at 277-79 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
All of these competing tests are evocative of tort law. That seems appropriate, given that
antidiscrimination statutes have tended to be tort-like in character. With the addition of §§ 703(m) and
706(g)(2)(B) to Title Vii, Congress appears to cut through all of the difficulties inherent in differentiating the
meaning of these various linguistic ways of describing the linkage between plaintiffs harm and defendant's
conduct by using the "a motivating factor" standard.
174 This is not unique to Title V1n. For example, in Northeastem Florida Chapter of Associated General
Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, the Court permitted the plaintiffs to attack the defendant's
affirmative action plan even though there was no showing that the plaintiff or any of its member contractors
would have won an award even absent the use of an allegedly invalid affirmative action plan. 508 U.S. 656
(1993).
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absence of the impermissible motivating factor." 175 If the defendant carries
that burden, then, in the language of Justice O'Connor in Hazen Paper,
discrimination is shown not to have had "a determinative influence on the
outcome."'176 In other words, full relief is denied to the plaintiff because a
discriminatory motive was not the but-for cause for the employer's action. In
contrast, if the defendant fails to establish its same-decision defense, then it is
reasonable to conclude that discrimination was the "determinative influence"
in the employer's decision. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to full remedies only
when the but-for level of showing is deemed to have been met-that is, when
the plaintiff shows "a motivating factor" and the defendant fails to show the
same decision would have been made even if it had not considered the
impermissible factor. 177 Justice O'Connor used this type analysis to support
her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse that allowed liability to be
established by a showing that discrimination was "a substantial factor" while
maintaining that the language "because of' in § 703(a) applied throughout
Title VII.
178
That leaves only two slight differences between the final operation of the
traditional McDonnell Douglas approach and § 703(m). First, the
consequences of neither party being able to carry her burden of persuasion can
mean that a few cases might be decided differently depending on which party
has that burden. If, using the traditional McDonnell Douglas approach, the
plaintiff fails to prove that discrimination was "the determinative influence" in
the employer's decision, the plaintiff loses entirely. However, if § 703(m) had
been applied to the same evidence, the plaintiff may have been able to
establish liability under the easier "a motivating factor" standard even though
she would not have been able to show that race or gender was the
determinative influence in the decision. If, in that case, the defendant fails to
carry its burden of persuasion on its § 706(g)(2)(B) same-decision defense, the
plaintiff gets full relief, even though she would not have been able to prove
discrimination to the but-for or determinative influence level in the first
instance. 179 Second, § 706(g)(2)(B) is not a full affirmative defense to liability
but is only a limit on plaintiffs full remedies. If the defendant successfully
carries its burden of proving the same-decision defense, the plaintiff will be
175 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000).
176 Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610.
177 As will be seen, a violation can be established with less.
178 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 274-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
179 This is simply an example of the consequences of imposing the burden of persuasion on different
parties.
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entitled to declaratory relief, attorney fees, and costs but not reinstatement,
backpay, or frontpay--even though race or sex was not the but-for cause of the
defendant's action.
These slight differences do not justify maintaining the complicated and
unmanageable system of having two separate methods of analyzing individual
discrimination cases. There is no sufficient justification to maintain the
"determinative influence" level of showing as necessary to establish liability in
any individual discrimination cases brought under Title VII, given that at the
end of the analysis that standard is largely met through the operation of
§ 703(m) and § 706(g)(2)(B). Thus, the "a motivating factor" showing should
suffice in all Title VII cases claiming individual discrimination. Moreover,
even if, as the next section will show, a dual system divided by the "a
motivating factor" standard for § 703(m) cases and the "determinative
influence" standard for McDonnell Douglas cases were maintained, it would
result in only a tiny subset of individual disparate treatment cases that use the
McDonnell Douglas standard. 180
C. Pretext and the Process of Elimination in McDonnell Douglas Cases
After Desert Palace, all that remains of McDonnell Douglas is its process
of elimination-the core notion of proving discrimination by convincing the
factfinder that the defendant's reason is pretext. One way to show
discrimination was involved in an employer's action is to show that the other
plausible reasons do not apply. As the Court has emphasized, employers
typically make decisions based on reasons, not on whimsy. Whep no reason
other than discrimination is present as an explanation for defendant's action, it
is reasonable, though not necessary, to find that the reason for the action was
discrimination. This raises the bedeviling aspect of Hicks: Hicks proved a
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case and proved that defendant's asserted
reason was not true. 181 Yet he lost because the factfinder thought the real
reason, though not established by any evidence in the record, was personal
animus against Hicks by his supervisor. 182 Thus, plaintiff Hicks lost becausehe was unable to convince the factfinder that he was discharged because of
180 Up until Desert Palace, only a small percentage of individual discrimination cases were analyzed
using the "a motivating factor" standard of § 703(m), with the vast majority analyzed pursuant to McDonnell
Douglas. If the "determinative influence" standard survives at all, Desert Palace will have flipped the
percentages.
181 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993).
182 Id. at 519.
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discrimination.183 Hicks shows that this process of elimination technique may
sometimes prove difficult for the factfinder because the factfinder may rely on
reasons that are extraneous to the record to find no discrimination.
Nevertheless, the McDonnell Douglas process of elimination is a
fundamentally sound way of persuading the factfinder that discrimination was
involved in the decision of the defendant that the plaintiff challenges.
Desert Palace certainly does not change the process of elimination as a
method of proving discrimination. If anything, the Court in Desert Palace
emphasized the usefulness of both circumstantial evidence and the process of
elimination based on that evidence to prove discrimination:
We have often acknowledged the utility of circumstantial evidence in
discrimination cases. For instance, in Reeves, we recognized that
evidence that a defendant's explanation for an employment practice
is "unworthy of credence" is "one form of circumstantial evidence
that is probative of intentional discrimination." The reason for
treating circumstantial evidence and direct evidence alike is both
clear and deep-rooted: "Circumstantial evidence is not only
sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive
than direct evidence." 1
84
With that affirmation of value of the process of elimination, it appears that this
technique first accepted in McDonnell Douglas will continue to play a role in
Title VII individual disparate treatment cases. The next section will describe
how that role plays out in the litigation of individual discrimination cases.
VI. LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL DISCRIMINATION CASES AFTER DESERT PALACE
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. 185 makes clear that Rule 8(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure requires only notice pleading for an individual
disparate treatment case.' 86  In addition to the claim of discrimination,
183 The application of § 703(m) might not have made a difference in Hicks since the trial judge, sitting as
factfinder, appeared convinced that no discrimination was involved, only personal animus. That is not certain,
however, since the trial judge may have thought that race as well as personal animus were involved, but that
race was not the determinative influence. If this case had been tried pursuant to § 703(m), liability would have
been established in that situation.
184 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) and Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957)) (emphasis in
original).
'8 534 U.S. 506,511-12 (2002).
186 FEDR. Civ. P. 8(a).
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plaintiff's complaint suffices if it includes a description of defendant's act that
plaintiff claims is discriminatory plus dates and other information sufficient to
put defendant on notice as to the nature of plaintiff's claim. 187  No theory of
discrimination need be identified to satisfy the requirements of notice
pleading. 188  Defendant can respond either with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a motion
for a more definite statement, or an answer denying that it discriminated.
Under the easily satisfied notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is presumably difficult to establish
grounds for dismissing any complaint that identifies some conduct of the
defendant that the plaintiff claims is discriminatory. Perforce, most defendants
have to answer. 189
Discovery follows the pleadings. The plaintiff will try to find any and all
evidence that is probative of discrimination. Correspondingly, the defendant
will try to find evidence to undermine the plaintiff's evidence and to prove that
the challenged conduct was not discriminatory. 190
The first time in the litigation process for a real challenge to the plaintiffs
case follows discovery when the defendant moves for summary judgment.191
187 Swierkiewicz means that McDonnell Douglas is not, in the sense that Rule 12(b)(6) uses it, a claim
upon which relief can be granted independent of a general claim of employment discrimination. As long as the
plaintiff pleads the factual basis underpinning her claim of discrimination, it would be inappropriate for a court
to grant a motion to dismiss for failing to make a claim upon which relief can be granted. Even if the plaintiff
does plead, for example, facts supporting a "barebones" showing of the elements of a McDonnell Douglas
case, a court should not dismiss as long as those facts provide adequate notice to the defendant of the basis for
her claim. The plaintiff need not point out what the defendant may have claimed was the nondiscriminatory
basis for the action nor does the plaintiff need to point to evidence that would support a finding that the
defendant's asserted reason is unworthy of credence.
188 There may be some close cases about what needs to be pled under notice pleading. In Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53-55 (2003), the Court held that the plaintiff, who brought an individual disparate
treatment claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, could not transform the case into a disparate impact
case by challenging the nondiscriminatory reason defendant asserted as having disparate impact on individuals
with disabilities. Presumably, to challenge the policy the employer relied on to refuse to hire plaintiff as
disparate impact discrimination, he would have had to claim in his initial complaint that this employment
practice or policy existed and that it had a disparate impact. That would have then timely satisfied the notice
pleading requirements established in Swierkiewicz.
189 If the defendant makes the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and the motion is denied, the defendant must then
answer the complaint.
190 Since it is the defendant's conduct that is at issue, presumably it has most of the information putting
that conduct into context. Thus, the thrust of the defendant's discovery is to uncover so-called "after-
acquired" evidence justifying the plaintiff's discharge in order to pretermit remedies as of the date of
discovery. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362-63 (1995).
191 See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555,
560(2001).
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To defeat that motion, the plaintiff must point to evidence she will introduce
that, if accepted by the factfinder, would support the ultimate issue in the
case-i.e., the challenged employment decision resulted from defendant's
intentional discrimination. 92 Thus, the evidence that the plaintiff assembles
must be compared to the claims of discrimination it supports. Using
§ 703(m)'s "a motivating factor" level of showing, a preponderance of the
evidence must support a reasonable factfinder in drawing the inference of
discrimination, that is, discrimination played a role, no matter how small, in
the decision.
The evidence can be used to support the inference of discrimination based
on a number of theories. First, "smoking gun" evidence-evidence that the
employer made a statement that can be viewed as an admission against interest
that it discriminated-is obviously relevant and probative of discrimination,
even if such evidence no longer needs to be labeled "direct" evidence of
discrimination in order to trigger the application of § 703(m). As the Court
recognized in Reeves, racist, sexist, or ageist comments by the employer that
do not constitute admissions that it discriminated against the plaintiff, are,
nevertheless, probative of the issue of the employer's intent to discriminate. 193
Second, as described by the Court in Teamsters v. United States, evidence
of unequal treatment supports drawing an inference of discrimination: "The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is
critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of
differences in treatment."' 94 Evidence that Costa was not treated equally with
her male coworkers was the main thrust of her case in Desert Palace.
195
192 Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for summary judgment following
discovery. For critiques of how district courts have made decisions on motions for summary judgment, see
Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 753 (1995) (arguing that courts have applied summary judgment law too
formalistically to individual discrimination cases that has "doomed otherwise valid discrimination claims");
Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in
Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 206 (1993).
193 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000). So-called "stray comments"
are circumstantial evidence of discrimination. See supra note 83.
194 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 276
(1976), involved a claim of unequal treatment by white employees discharged for theft who claimed a
similarly situated African American had not been discharged.
195 Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Third, evidence that the plaintiff was subjected to stereotyping, like the
evidence accepted in Price Waterhouse, is also relevant to the .question of
whether the defendant intended to discriminate against the plaintiff.
Fourth, evidence that the employer failed to follow its own policies is
another kind of evidence that is relevant to proving intent to discriminate.
Thus in Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, the Eleventh Circuit
held that it is evidence of discrimination in a failure to promote case when
"Carter proved that Three Springs had a policy of posting job vacancies, not
adhered to in this case."
197
Fifth, the whole range of evidence that the Court described in McDonnell
Douglas as relevant to the issue of pretext is probative of discrimination. This
is because this evidence of pretext comes into the trial during the plaintiffs
case in chief and is not really focused on surrebutting the defendant's asserted
nondiscriminatory reason. 198 The wide range of potentially probative evidence
was described in McDonnell Douglas as follows:
[E]vidence that may be relevant to any showing of pretext includes
facts as to the petitioner's treatment of respondent during his prior
term of employment; petitioner's reaction, if any, to respondent's
legitimate civil rights activities; and petitioner's general policy and
practice with respect to minority employment. On the latter point,
statistics as to petitioner's employment policy and practice may be
helpful to a determination of whether petitioner's refusal to rehire
respondent in this case conformed to a general pattern of
discrimination against blacks.'
99
196 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
197 132 F.3d 635, 644 (11 th Cir. 1998).
198 While the McDonnell Douglas method is described as a three-step process, the trial of discrimination
cases follows the general two-step process of civil litigation. Further, the first two steps, the plaintiff's prima
facie case and the defendant's rebuttal, are, as the Court said in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 186 (1989), "not onerous." Thus, the true focus on the case comes down to the pretext stage, where, as
the Court indicated in Burdine, the question of pretext "merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the
court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional discrimination." Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
199 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 792, 804-05. (1973). As Professor Tristin K. Green
noted: "The McDonnell Douglas framework as explained by the Supreme Court never eliminated a plaintiffs
option to prove disparate treatment through circumstantial evidence without attacking the defendant's
proffered reason." Green, supra note 161, at 997. Further, "the Court's rationale behind the McDonnell
Douglas framework neither requires, nor implies, that the falsity-of-proferred [pretext] method of proof is the
sole method of proof within the framework." Id. at 999.
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As Desert Palace showed, the treatment of Costa by the employer before the
altercation that brought about her discharge made her case much stronger. It
gave the record a richness of context surrounding her discharge, strefigthening
the inference that discrimination was at play in her discharge. The fact that she
was the first and only woman working in the defendant's warehouse provided
200
contextual support for a finding that discrimination motivated her discharge.
More broadly, "bottom line" statistical evidence of whether the employer's
employment policies and practices result in a diverse workforce is useful in
judging the motivation of the employer in any particular employment decision.
Such evidence is certainly not conclusive: an employer with "good stats" may
have discriminated in a particular case,201 and an employer with "bad stats"
cannot be presumed to have discriminated in a particular case. But the context
established by the employer's workforce statistics is relevant to and probative
of the issue of the intent of the employer when a particular employment
decision is challenged. Simply, an employer with "bad stats" is less believable
202than an employer with good ones, all else being equal.
Finally, the McDonnell Douglas approach-evidence establishing a prima
facie case by excluding the most common nondiscriminatory reasons that
might explain the employer's action-also obviously supports drawing the
inference that the action was motivated by discrimination. Further, if the
defendant has asserted a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the plaintiff
can support her case against a motion for summary judgment by pointing to
evidence that would justify a finding that the employer's reason was not the
true basis for its decision.
Under the approach adopted in § 703(m), all of these different types of
evidence can help form the basis for a reasonable factfinder to draw the
inference of discrimination under the "a motivating factor" standard for
200 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1685 (1998) (discussing
the reaction of incumbent workers to trailblazers such as Costa).
201 See Fumco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 566, 580 (1978) ("Proof that [a] work force was racially
balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly
irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided.").
202 In Patterson, 491 U.S. at 187-88, the Court held that the lower court erred in limiting the scope of
evidence plaintiff could introduce to prove pretext to evidence that would specifically rebut the
nondiscriminatory reason asserted by the employer. The description of the scope of that evidence was not as
comprehensive as the one set forth in McDonnell Douglas. The grounds for the partialdissent of Justice
Brennan (Stevens did not join) was that evidence of the general policy and practices of the employer
concerning the employment of African Americans, especially statistical evidence, was relevant to and
probative of discrimination. Id. at 217.
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establishing liability. Looking at the litigation of individual discrimination
cases from the viewpoint of a court determining a motion for summary
judgment, the correct approach under § 703(m) closely resembles the approach
203
used in general litigation. Basically, that approach is to review the evidence
and draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the nonmoving party. 204 Thus,
if there is sufficient evidence in an individual discrimination case that would
support a reasonable jury's decision to draw an inference of discrimination,
then defendant's motion should be denied.
Suppose that instead of the rich evidentiary records such as those in Reeves
or Desert Palace, all that a plaintiff has is the "barebones" evidence sufficient
to support a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas but no more. Burdine
described the consequences of proof of a prima facie case:
Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If
the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer
is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enterpudgment
for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case. 0
5
From this statement, it appears that if the plaintiff points to evidence that
would support a reasonable jury's conclusion that the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse action plaintiff challenges do not
apply, then the defendant's summary judgment motion should be denied.
203 Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment while
Rule 50 governs motions for judgment as a matter of law. The motion for summary judgment occurs before
trial while the motion for judgment as a matter of law can occur during or after trial. The supervisory function
of the court, however, is essentially the same in both: to guarantee that factfinders are limited to deciding
questions of material fact on all the elements necessary to establish liability if the motion is filed by the
defendant or to establish an affirmative defense if the motion is filed by the plaintiff.
As to motions for judgment as a matter of law, Reeves described how this should work. Starting by
looking at all the evidence in the record, "the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence .... [Allthough the
court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the
jury is not required to believe." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000).
204 See Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas, A Simplified Method for
Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 671-72 (1998). When faced with these
motions, plaintiff has to point to evidence that she will introduce sufficient to support a jury finding for her on
all the issues on which she carries the burden of persuasion. See Matushita Elecs. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Davis, supra note 6, at 861; Deborah C. Malamud, The
Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2237 (1995); McGinley, supra note
192, at 203.
205 Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
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If McDonnell Douglas retains any meaning as setting a "determinative
influence" level of showing to establish liability, the situation of a plaintiff
with only a "barebones" prima facie case and no more would be the one
situation in which the plaintiff might have to resort to McDonnell Douglas
instead of relying on § 703(m)'s "a motivating factor" test. But a footnote
accompanying that text in Burdine puts that interpretation in doubt by
suggesting that evidence of the prima facie case alone is not a sufficient basis
for a reasonable jury to draw the inference of discrimination:
The phrase "prima facie case" not only may denote the establishment
of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but also may be used
by courts to describe the plaintiff's burden of producing enough
evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue.
McDonnell Douglas should have made it apparent that in the
Title VII context we use "prima facie case" in the former sense.2 °6
The thrust of this passage is that establishing a prima facie case does not
necessarily mean that the plaintiff has produced enough evidence that a
reasonable jury could find intent to discriminate. A minimal McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case only establishes a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination but does not support a reasonable jury drawing the inference of
intent to discriminate. Thus, a plaintiff with only a prima facie case would lose
in the defendant's motion for summary judgment if the defendant's motion
207points to evidence that it introduces a nondiscriminatory reason. In that
situation, the presumption has its desired effect of "smoking out" the
defendant's alleged nondiscriminatory reason; once it performs that function,
208the presumption drops from the case. Yet, what if defendants move for
summary judgment even while refusing to come forward with a reason? If
defendants could win summary judgment without pointing to evidence as to
their alleged nondiscriminatory reason, they would have a strong incentive to
stand mute, which would be at odds with the "smoke out" rationale of the
Burdine presumption.
206 id. at 254 n.7 (internal citations omitted).
207 The plaintiff, however, can almost always defeat the defendant's motion for summary judgment if she
is able to point to evidence she will introduce to prove that the reason defendant has asserted is unworthy of
credence. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43.
208 Bringing defendant's alleged nondiscriminatory reason into play, however, transforms the case into a
"mixed-motive" case with the effect of taking it out of situation where the McDonnell Douglas "determinative
influence" standard applies and into the "a motivating factor" realm of § 703(m).
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Therefore, if McDonnell Douglas has any continuing significance, it is
when the plaintiff has only proof of a "barebones" prima facie case eliminating
the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the defendant's action and the
defendant does not point to evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for its
action. The plaintiff should be able to go to trial even if that prima facie case
is all that she has, assuming the defendant refuses to assert a nondiscriminatory
reason to defeat the prima facie effect of plaintiff's showing. This is necessary
to push the defendant to assert a nondiscriminatory reason for its action-the
"smoke out" function described in Burdine. If the plaintiff is not allowed to go
to trial, then McDonnell Douglas has lost all meaning beyond the force of its
process of elimination argument to the factfinder.
At the close of the plaintiff's case in chief, the defendant theoretically faces
a choice: stand pat by attacking the plaintiff s proof of her prima facie case or
put in additional evidence of the nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.
209
If the defendant stands pat and the judge determines that there are material
questions of fact regarding the plaintiff's prima facie case-if Burdine is to be
believed-then the defendant loses, if the jury believes the plaintiff's proof of
her elemental prima facie case, because there is no nondiscriminatory
explanation asserted by the defendant to explain its action. Given that proof of
a prima facie case is not onerous, 2 1° the factfinder, relying on the
preponderance of evidence test, is likely to find for the plaintiff. The plaintiff,
therefore, is entitled to a verdict in this extremely attenuated situation by
establishing her prima facie case without the necessity of proving that
211defendant acted with an intent to discriminate. Only an exceptional, risk-
preferring defendant would take the chance that the jury would not believe the
plaintiffs evidence of a prima facie case. Thus, it is only in the extraordinary
situation that the plaintiff has only a "barebones" prima facie case and the
defendant refuses to assert a nondiscriminatory reason that the McDonnell
Douglas "determinative influence" standard will apply. But, in that rare case,
the only question presented to the jury is whether plaintiff has proved her
prima facie case.
209 Given discovery, prior motions for summary judgment and motions for judgment as a matter of law, as
well as various pretrial procedures, this seems more of an analytical than a practical question.
210 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989). Indeed, this is a situation in which the
plaintiff might be successful seeking a judgment as a matter of law wherein a reasonable jury would have to
believe the plaintiffs prima facie case.
211 Since the defendant has failed to introduce evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct, that
is never at issue.
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212Faced with the high risk of standing mute, defendants will almost always
introduce evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason to explain their action. 213 As
suggested during the oral argument in Desert Palace, once the defendant
introduces evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason the case ceases to be a
single-motive case subject to the McDonnell Douglas "determinative
influence" standard because, at that stage, it becomes at least potentially a
mixed-motive case governed by § 703(m), and must be treated accordingly.
At the close of the defendant's case, and assuming that motions for
judgment as a matter of law are denied, the case is ready to go to the jury214
using the § 703(m) instruction approved in Desert Palace-the "a motivating
factor" test.215  If the defendant asks for and the judge determines there is
sufficient evidence in the record that a reasonable jury could find the same-
decision defense, then the § 706(g)(2)(B) instruction is given.216
212 Part of what makes standing pat risky is that the jury is likely to expect the employer to have a
nondiscriminatory explanation for its action. In Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188 (1997), a
criminal case, the Court indicated that jury expectations "about what proper proof should be" influences the
scope of relevancy:
[Tihere lies the need for evidence in all its particularity to satisfy the jurors' expectations about
what proper proof should be. Some such demands they bring with them to the courthouse,
assuming, for example, that a charge of using a firearm to commit an offense will be proven by
introducing a gun in evidence. A prosecutor who fails to produce one, or some good reason for his
failure, has something to be concerned about.
213 Denny Chin and Jodi Golinsky indicate that, as of the date of their article, no reported case involved a
failure of a defendant to come forward with a nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Chin & Golinsky, supra
note 204, at 665. The only situation when a defendant might try this gambit is when it is convinced that the
jury will not find that the plaintiff's prima facie case has been established. Id.
214 If a jury is waived and the judge is the factfinder, the judge finds the facts and applies the law pursuant
to Desert Palace.
215 The instruction was: "[T]he plaintiff has the burden of proving . . . by a preponderance of the evidence
that she 'suffered adverse work conditions' and that her sex was a motivating factor in any such work
conditions imposed upon her." Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 96 (2003) (quoting Costa v. Desert
Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 858 (9th Cir. 2002)).
216 This jury instruction is also an example from Desert Palace:
If you find that the plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the defendant's treatment of the
plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you find that the defendant's conduct was
also motivated by a lawful reason. However, if you find that the defendant's treatment of the
plaintiff was motivated by both gender and lawful reasons, you must decide whether the plaintiff
is entitled to damages. The plaintiff is entitled to damages unless the defendant proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff similarly, even if
the plaintiffs gender had played no role in the employment decision.
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One potential problem with merging McDonnell Douglas into a uniform
structure based on § 703(m) is that historically Price Waterhouse "mixed-
motive" cases have been treated as somewhat of a "third rail" issue by
defendants as well as plaintiffs. Given that the vast majority of individual
discrimination cases have been treated as McDonnell Douglas cases, both
defendants and plaintiffs may be reluctant to use the mixed-motive analysis
because they share the feeling that the known devil of McDonnell Douglas is
better than the unknown devil of § 703(m). Further, defendants do not relish
the prospect of ever carrying the burden of persuasion on any issue in a
discrimination case. But plaintiffs fear the same-decision defense will tempt
the jury to "split the baby," finding liability under § 703(m)'s "a motivating
factor" standard, but then finding that the defendant proved its same-decision
defense-thereby depriving plaintiff of the most important remedies. Plaintiffs
also do not want to give defendants that second bite at the apple under the
§ 706(g)(2)(B) same-decision defense. Since only a small subset of individual
discrimination cases were ever tried under the old Price Waterhouse approach,
it may be that the parties will just have to come to grips with a new world of
individual discrimination law through experience with the new system. Since
Desert Palace is framed in a way to give an alternative to the plaintiff to ask
for a § 703(m) "a motivating factor" instruction, plaintiffs presumably will
have the ability to continue to seek a McDonnell Douglas "determinative
influence" instruction. The Court in Desert Palace described its holding as
putting the issue in the hands of the plaintiff: "In order to obtain an
instruction under [§ 703(m)], a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence
for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice."21 7
Thus, Desert Palace does not appear to foreclose the use of the classic
McDonnell Douglas approach if the plaintiff asks for instructions that require
her to prove that discrimination was the determinative influence in the
employer's decision. That would impose a higher threshold on the plaintiff to
establish liability than the "a motivating factor" standard in § 703(m) but it
would also avoid the possibility of sending the same-decision defense to the
jury. Though that does not seem the best strategic choice in general, 218 it may
217 Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
218 If the plaintiff is convinced that her case will be compelling to the factfinder, she may take the chance
of asking for the higher "determinative influence" standard to apply in order to foreclose the defendant's
ability to limit remedies pursuant to the same-decision defense in § 706(g)(2)(B).
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be that McDonnell Douglas can survive beyond the very small area where it
analytically still applies. But that seems to require the concurrence of the
defendant2 9-since it would appear that a defendant can respond to the
plaintiffs request to have the case treated as a McDonnell Douglas "single-
motive" case by arguing that the case should be analyzed as a mixed-motive
case because the defendant has introduced evidence of a nondiscriminatory
reason for its action. Defendants may have an incentive to do just that in order
to get the benefit of the same-decision defense.
220
In sum, litigating individual discrimination cases using § 703(m) is feasible
for all Title VII individual discrimination cases. Under the approach adopted
by the Supreme Court in its individual discrimination cases decided since
1996, the lower courts should decide defendants' motions for summary
judgment or for judgment as a matter of law with the expectation that plaintiffs
will win more under the new system than the dual method system that reigned
before Desert Palace. It may take some time, however, to discover how
effective this new system is.
The prior, dual system certainly was a difficult one for plaintiffs. Professor
Michael Selmi has shown that at the pretrial stage, 98% of employment
discrimination cases were decided for defendants compared, for example, with
66% of insurance cases. 221 At trial, plaintiffs had a slightly lower success rate
in employment discrimination cases than in insurance cases. 222  Professor
David Benjamin Oppenheimer reinforces Professor Selmi's study.223 Looking
219 Because the Desert Palace Court appeared to give to the plaintiff the authority to ask for an instruction
under § 703(h) when she has introduced sufficient evidence to support a reasonable jury drawing the inference
that race or gender was "a motivating factor" in defendant's action, even if other factors were also involved, it
follows that the defendant would be able to ask for an instruction under §§ 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B) when it
claims a nondiscriminatory reason for the action and that, even if discrimination was "a motivating factor," it
would have taken the same action even if it had not discriminated.
220 Presumably, if the defendant shares the estimate made by the plaintiff that the jury would likely find
for the plaintiff under the McDonnell Douglas "determinative influence" standard, the defendant loses little by
exposing itself to liability under the "a motivating factor" standard, while potentially gaining a lot with the
chance to limit plaintiffs remedies pursuant to the same-decision defense.
221 Selmi, supra note 191, at 560 (claiming that, based on success rates, trial courts are much more hostile
to employment discrimination cases than insurance and personal injury cases).
222 Id. There is, however, a significant difference in outcomes in trials depending on whether the case is
tried to a judge or to a jury: "Plaintiffs [in employment discrimination cases] are ... half as successful when
their cases are tried before a judge than a jury, and success rates are more than 50 percent below the rate of
other claims." Id. at 560-61.
223 David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment
Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities,
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 516-17 (2003).
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at California employment cases, he finds employment discrimination cases
very hard to win. Not only are plaintiffs' success rates somewhat higher,
looking at common law discharge cases (59%) compared with statutory
employment discrimination cases (50%), but when sexual harassment cases
were excluded from the study, the plaintiffs' success in statutory cases dropped
significantly. "[T]he data demonstrate that discrimination cases are hardest to
win when brought by non whites (and particularly black women) alleging race
discrimination, women alleging sex discrimination (except for sexual
harassment), and women over forty alleging age discrimination. 224 Plaintiffs
do no better on appeal, whether they won or lost at trial. Professors Theodore
Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab have published data showing that "employment
discrimination plaintiffs do dramatically worse than defendants on appeal"
which is one indicium of how hard it has been for plaintiffs to win
discrimination cases.
225
When an employment discrimination defendant wins at trial and the case is
reviewed on appeal, only 5.8% of those judgments are reversed. By contrast,
when an employment discrimination plaintiff wins at trial and the case is
reviewed on appeal, 43.61% of those judgments are reversed. The 43.61%
reversal rate of plaintiff trial victories is greater in employment discrimination
cases than in any other category of cases except "other civil rights cases." The
5.8% reversal rate of defendant trial victories is smaller in employment
discrimination cases than any other category of cases except prisoner habeas
corpus trials.226
One explanation for the dismal success rate for plaintiffs in discrimination
cases might be that there is little discrimination and so the cases are generally
correctly decided. That argument is undercut, however, by evidence that
discrimination continues to plague the American workplace. Professors Alfred
W. Blumrosen and Ruth G. Blumrosen have undertaken a major study, using
the information employers are required to submit to the EEOC in the annual
EEO-1 Form. 2 27 In the longitudinal survey from 1975 to 1999, the good news
224 Id.
225 Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Double Standard on Appeal: An Empirical Analysis of
Employment Discrimination Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 1 (July 16, 2001), at http://www.findjustice.
com/ms/pdf/double-standard.pdf.
226 Id. (internal citations omitted).
227 Alfred W. Blumrosen & Ruth G. Blumrosen, The Reality of Intentional Job Discrimination in
Metropolitan America-I 999, at 1 (2002), at http://law.newark.rutgers.edulblumrosen-eeo.html.
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was that women and minority men had made significant employment gains. 228The bad news was that considerable discrimination persists:
For 1999, 75,793-or 37 percent [of the 160,000 establishments
studied]--discriminated against Minorities in at least one
occupational category .... For 1999, 60,425-or 29 percent-of
establishments discriminated against Women in at least one
occupational category . . . . A "hard core" of 22,269 [of about
160,000] establishments appear to have discriminated over a nine
year period against Minorities, and 13,173 establishments appear to
have done so against Women. This "hard core" is responsible for
roughly half of the intentional discrimination we have identified."'
Assuming that the lower courts fully implement Reeves and Desert Palace,
the approach the courts would then be taking toward individual discrimination
cases would more closely approximate the approach taken toward general civil
litigation. Presumably, the results of that new approach would also come more
closely to resemble the outcomes in civil litigation generally. That means that
many fewer motions for summary judgment would be won by defendants,
more cases would go to trial, and fewer motions for judgment as a matter of
law would be made in favor of defendants in discrimination cases.
2 30
Those are large assumptions. It is also possible that judges will continue to
decide individual discrimination cases at the pretrial and trial -stages for
defendants. 231 Using the new approach, can they reach the same result pattern
228 Id. at 26.
229 Id. at 74. "Hard core" discriminators were defined as employers:
[S]o far below average in an occupation that there is only one in one hundred chances that the
result occurred by accident (2.5 standard deviations) [versus the 2 standard deviations used to
determine systemic disparate treatment in Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S.
299, 311 n.17 (1977)] in 1999 and in either 1998 or 1997, and in at least one year between 1991
and 1996, and was not above average between 1991 and 1999.
Id. at 95.
230 All of this means that the settlement value of individual discrimination cases should also rise.
Increasing the economic value of these cases may cause more attorneys to represent plaintiffs in discrimination
cases. Reducing the proportion of pro se cases would solve one of the complaints judges have about the
discrimination cases on their dockets.
231 See Selmi, supra note 191, at 555 (arguing that the federal judiciary is not sympathetic to plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases). Since Desert Palace made the law more plaintiff-friendly, only time will
tell how educable federal judges are in implementing the new law of discrimination. "It would be very
optimistic to assume that all judges are educable." Michael J. Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 COLUM. HUMAN
RTS. L. REv. 575, 599 n.132 (2003).
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of results as under the prior system? 232 At the summary judgment stage as well
as at the motion for judgment as a matter of law stage, judges following Reeves
will be required to review the evidence drawing every reasonable inference in
favor of the plaintiff with the substantive law being set by § 703(m), which
now presumptively governs all individual disparate treatment cases. Parsing
the language of § 703(m), the term "demonstrates" is itself defined in § 701(m)
to mean "meets the burdens of production and persuasion." Given the
interpretation in Desert Palace that "demonstrates" does not carry with it any
special, heightened evidentiary standards, it is unlikely that judges will find
much purchase to resist the impact of Desert Palace there.
Perhaps more likely for the development of a restrictive application of
§ 703(m) will be found in interpreting what constitutes "a motivating factor."
Since the term is new to Title VII in the 1991 amendments and since few
courts had applied it to cases because of the "direct" evidence threshold now
rejected in Desert Palace, there are fewer restraints to the development of a
restrictive interpretation than with the term "demonstrates." There is, however,
legislative history that supports the interpretation that discrimination was "a
motivating factor" if it played any role at all in the employer's decision. Thus,
the House Report on the bill destined to become the 1991 Civil Rights Act
describes the meaning of the term a "contributing factor," which was
ultimately replaced, in the enacted bill, with the language "a motivating
factor."
[I]n providing liability for discrimination that is a "contributing
factor," the Committee intends to restore the rule applied in many
federal circuits prior to the Price Waterhouse decision that an
employer may be held liable for any discrimination that is actually
233shown to play a role in a contested employment decision.
232 Given the decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002), it is unlikely that judges
will be in a position to increase the proportion of defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiffs' complaints for
failing to state claims upon which relief can be granted.
233 H.R. REP. No. 102-40, Part 1, at 48 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 586 (second
emphasis added). The change from the language "contributing factor" that ultimately became "motivating
factor" when the Act was passed was not intended to suggest any change in concept. In the House Report
accompanying the bill as finally passed by Congress, the change is described as follows: "The substitute's
new language changes the grounds upon which an individual may bring suit against a company for
discriminatory intent from that intent being 'a contributing' factor to a 'motivating' factor. This change is
cosmetic and will not materially change the courts'findings." 137 CONG. REc. H3944-45 (daily ed. June 5,
1991) (emphasis added) (inserted explanation by Rep. Stenholm).
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Divining any difference in results depending on the levels of showing less
than but-for is difficult, but surely the "a motivating factor" standard is much
easier to satisfy than is but-for. Given the sharp difference that Justices White
and O'Connor saw between "a motivating part" proposed by the plurality in
Price Waterhouse and their preferred language of "a substantial factor," it is
clear that "a motivating factor" is less difficult for plaintiffs than would be "a
substantial factor" and "a substantial factor" is, if Justice O'Connor is to be
believed in Price Waterhouse, much easier to establish than but-for.
Presumably, careful review of the facts of many cases over time might reveal
that judges, resistant to a more plaintiff-friendly interpretation of Title VII,
were heightening what "a motivating factor" means. Nevertheless, they would
fail to interpret it correctly if the showing approached the "a substantial factor"
level, much less the but-for level.
The final new term added in § 703(m) is "employment practice." It is also
used in § 703(k), the provision the 1991 Act added to Title VII to codify the
disparate impact theory of liability. It may well be that courts, looking for
ways to restrict the scope of § 703(m), may develop restrictive interpretations
of what constitutes an "employment practice." This would be consistent with
how some courts have construed the "terms and conditions" of employment in
§ 703(a).234 The better reading of the term "employment practice" is that it is
intended to keep Title VII's focus on employment versus nonemployment
matters. 235 Over time it will be interesting to see if the lower courts develop a
narrow gloss on "employment practice" that limits the full operation of
234 E.g., Russell v. Principi, 257 F.3d 815, 819 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[TIhe logic of an action that is 'adverse
in an absolute sense' fits poorly with employment decisions involving bonuses .... A performance evaluation
can drop below an average, but a bonus cannot be negative."); Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232,
1242-43 (11 th Cir. 2001) ("A negative evaluation that otherwise would not be actionable will rarely, if ever,
become actionable merely because the employee comes forward with evidence that his future prospects have
been or will be hindered as a result."); Bruno v. City of Crown Point, 950 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1991) (evidence
of asking only women candidates about family issues was not sufficient to support finding of intentional
discrimination). Rebecca Hanner White provides an effective critique of this line of cases:
Congress's use of the phrase "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges" emphasizes the
employment-related nature of the prohibited discrimination. The phrase is better read as making
clear that an employer who discriminates against an employee in a non-job-related context would
not run afoul of Title VIl, rather than as sheltering employment discrimination that does not
significantly disadvantage an employee.
Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1151 (1998); see also Tristin K.
Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory,
38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 98, 102 (2002) (arguing that changes in employer structure will make it more
difficult to show adverse action in employment decisions).
235 See White, supra note 234, at 1151.
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§ 703(m), just as some have done in limiting the scope of protection afforded
by § 703(a) with narrow interpretations of "terms and conditions" of
employment in that section of the statute.
No doubt the largest risk to the development of the full plaintiff-friendly
role of § 703(m) is that, in deciding motions for summary judgment and
judgment as a matter of law, judges will simply fail to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party-the plaintiff-and will fail to
draw every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmoving party based on that
evidence. While this would contravene the lesson the Supreme Court gave in
Reeves, the exercise, of that power by lower courts is hard for the Supreme
Court to review.
236
CONCLUSION
Since 1996, the Supreme Court has decided four individual discrimination
cases. All were unanimous and all were favorable to the interests of a fuller
protection of the rights of the individual to be protected from discrimination.
These decisions now can be seen as being in sharp contrast to those that came
before. Especially in light of Reeves and Desert Palace, the new direction
appears to be toward an approach that focuses on the evidence in the record
and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn based on that evidence. In
other words, individual discrimination law is increasingly resembling the
237approach taken by courts in general civil litigation.
The process of elimination method of argumentation as to what constitutes
discrimination that is at the core of McDonnell Douglas is entirely consistent
with this new approach. As a method of analysis separate from § 703(m), the
McDonnell Douglas "determinative influence" standard applies only in those
rare situations when a plaintiff has a "barebones" prima facie case and nothing
more and defendant decides not to assert a nondiscriminatory reason to rebut
the prima facie case. In that extremely rare situation, Hazen Paper's
"determinative influence" level of showing applies. Otherwise, unless both
plaintiff and defendant agree that McDonnell Douglas applies, the "a
motivating factor" test established in § 703(m) applies to all individual
236 See Zimmer, Leading by Example, supra note 72, at 188-89; Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing, supra note 72,
at 577-78.
237 For the ramifications of Desert Palace on "revere" discrimination cases, see Charles A. Sullivan,
Reversing Title VII: "Reverse Discrimination" Jurisprudence (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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disparate treatment cases brought pursuant to Title VII. But for that very
small subset of cases in which the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies, the
defendant will be liable if race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was "a
motivating factor" for the action the plaintiff attacks. If an impermissible
factor was a motivating factor, the defendant has the opportunity provided by
§ 706(g)(2)(B) to prove as an affirmative defense to full remedies that it would
have made the same decision even if it had not considered the impermissible
factor.
238 The issues connected with the possible application of Desert Palace to Title VII retaliation cases as
well as ADEA and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 cases are beyond the scope of this paper.
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